Saladin's son al-Afdal and the Emir Kukbari of Harran drew the campaign's first blood with their successful reconnaissance-in-force to the springs of Cresson on May 1. At around the same time, Saladin moved south from Damascus to ravage Reynald de Chatillon's seigneurie of Oultrejourdain, both to punish him for his attack on the pilgrims' caravan the previous winter and to ensure that safe passage of another large caravan bound for Mecca that included one of Saladin's nephews. Saladin's brother al-Adil marched from Cairo at the end of March and joined him in Oultrejourdain, where he turned most of his troops over to Saladin before returning to Egypt. Saladin's grand strategy may have envisioned a pincer attack on the Kingdom of Jerusalem, with Saladin himself leading the initial thrust from Damascus, while al-Adil led a second attack up the coast of Palestine a short time afterwards.

Saladin spent the period from late May until the last week of June waiting for his subordinate emirs to arrive with their contingents from Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Mosul, and the towns of the Jezireh in what is now southeastern Turkey (Mardin, Edessa, Nisibin, and Diyarbakir). The designated assembly point was Ashtara, in the Hauran hills south of Damascus. By Wednesday, June 24, his army was at full strength, and Saladin held a general review. The sources agree that his force included 12,000 cavalry, but estimates of the total size of his force range from 30,000-45,000. The elite Tawashiya cavalrymen wore coats of mail that were quite comparable to that of the western knights, while less wealthy horsemen would have had a mail cowl that covered the head and shoulders and a padded cuirass to protect the torso. There were also substantial numbers of horse archers who wore significantly less armor, because their role was to move in quickly to harass the enemy with volleys of arrows and then to make their escape, rather than engaging the western knights in hand-to-hand combat. The infantry included skilled archers and crossbowmen as well as masses of non-professional foot soldiers equipped with spears, swords, and shields, but no body armor.

On June 26, Saladin marched his men out from their camp in battle formation. The left wing was commanded by Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi, Emir of Harran and Edessa. Kukburi was an experienced general who had served the Zengids as their army commander at Aleppo before defecting to Saladin, who gave him one of his sisters in marriage. Saladin's nephew, Taki ed-Din, Emir of Hama and lord of central Syria, commanded the right wing, a traditional post of honor that was often used in an offensive capacity. Saladin himself commanded the center.

The Arab army marched down from the great escarpment of the Golan Heights and reached the southern shore of the Sea of Galilee at Al Qahwani the following day. The bulk of the army camped there for the next four nights, while Saladin sent detachments across the Jordan to reconnoiter the territory beyond. Once he was satisfied that the main Crusader army was still concentrated near Sephoria, Saladin crossed the Jordan on July 1 at Sennabra. The following morning, he divided his forces, sending part of his troops against Tiberias, the chief town of the principality of Galilee, while he continued on with the bulk of his army towards Kafr Sebt (Cafarsset), five miles west of Tiberias, where he set up a blocking position astride the main road from Sephoria to Tiberias. Here he would be in a position to intercept any advance by King Guy's army.

Count Raymond and his three stepsons were away with the King's army at Sephoria, so few troops were available to defend Tiberias when Saladin's levies marched into view. The Countess Eschiva sent off a messenger to her husband at Sephoria to report what was happening. Saladin's troops seized the small lakeside town itself after a short fight, but Countess Eschiva and her small garrison withdrew inside the castle, where they could expect hold the Saracens off for some time. The campaign of Hattin had begun.

Principal Sources:

Francesco Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades (1984) at 116-19

David Nicolle, Hattin 1187: Saladin's Greatest Victory (1993) [Osprey Campaign Series] at 14-17, 21-42

Jonathan Riley-Smith, ed., Atlas of the Crusades (1991), at 60-61

Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, Volume 2: The Kingdom of Jerusalem (1951), at 455