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Timidus Continentis: Oglethorpus timorque Floridae
Afraid of the Continent: Oglethorpe and the Fear of Florida by Brad Blair
During the first half of the eighteenth century, France loomed large as England’s greatest fear in the New World. While many attacks and wars had been fought between the English and the Spanish in the southern Atlantic colonies, England and her colonies knew they had nothing to fear from Spanish Florida.
In examining the writings of James Oglethorpe I have found clear evidence that the perceived threat was not the enemy to the south, but the traditional one: France. His opinions as a British governor can readily be said to exemplify the attitude of the British towards Florida. He was considered by many to be a philanthropist and did much to improve the prison system in the England of his time. In addition to being the founder and first governor of Georgia (a colony of refuge for the religously oppressed), he was also a nobleman from Surrey outside London. Oglethorpe fought for the right to make war on Spain in Florida. He even managed to lay siege to the key city of St. Augustine, though that ultimately failed. Much of his energy and time was consumed in this quest, as a matter of fact. He struggled arduously to acquire men and materiel from the South Carolina legislature to subsidize his raids into Spanish territory. These were eventually won, but not enough to get him his victory over St. Augustine. The attitude of James Oglethorpe regarding the trichotomy between France, England and Spain can be divided into three proofs. These are his belief that firstly, the French economy was much stronger than England’s and more aptly mobilized for war; second, Spain could easily have been destroyed in the southeast of North America; and finally, that clamoring prematurely for war with France would have been fatal if obliged. It is important to note that the second proof is only his opinion. Oddly enough, this opinion remained constant through the writing of the Naked Truth, despite his personal defeat at the hands of the Spanish sixteen years before. When looking at the subjects he chose to write about regarding the inter-colonial relationships, you can see that his ultimate objective was to maneuver England via the power of his writings, both in Europe and the New World, into a position in which it could overpower France, whom he saw as the winning power should a war break out (which was an almost constant fear at this time). My analysis comes from an article written by Oglethorpe, called “The Naked Truth.” This document preached strongly against fighting a war with France. While the Naked Truth never advocated war with Spain in Florida, James Oglethorpe’s actions in the past clearly show that he did not think this would have been a problem. In other words, it wouldn’t have been something that would hurt England. His terror at the prospect of a renewed Anglo-French fight is clearly evident. From this I deduce that his stubborn attitude against Florida was aimed at exterminating a potential base of power for the real enemy, which was France. Of course this is textbook imperialist theory at work, but what is new is the notion that Spain was not the perceived direct threat. Oglethorpe first and foremost believed that France would be victorious in any fight that would take place, excepting perhaps on the seas, where England still maintained dominance. He notes that were the English to begin war with France, it would inevitably spill over to the north Florida region. Often times before this had already occurred in greater or lesser degrees during King William’s War, Queen Anne’s War, King George’s War, Jenkin’s Ear etc. France would have been able to raise money to train troops, while England, which had already been in debt, would sink even further. I can hardly claim to understand Oglethorpe’s description of his contemporary English economics; but in short, he writes that the French, during a war, can boost their national revenue by four million pounds (he uses English currency), bringing them to a total of 19,000,000. England, he writes, could in fact double their revenue, but it still only arrives at the paltry sum of 2,000,000 pounds. And what is generated by surplus must be used to lower the principal of the national debt. He claims that the government would not -even in a time of war- appropriate the extra to the war effort. Spain on the other hand, both at home and abroad, was a declining power. While England was strapped, it was definitely not in the straits the Spanish Empire found itself in. In a short history of the region, Oglethorpe explains the accepted method for colonizing, which Spain did not adhere to and whose preferred method of colonizing was perceived thusly: “...Occupancy is the most unquestionable Title...touching at a Coast for Fuel and Water; erecting a Cross, or the Arms of a Prince, or State, and trapanning away two or three of the Savage Natives into Captivity, are not such an Occupancy as can reasonably acquire the Dominion of a Country...” (Baine 1994, 210) This is a good example of the English perception that the Spanish never really had any right to be so far north in the first place. They had not properly invested their claims. It also reinforces the notion that there really was not anything to fighting the Spanish, as opposed to the French in the region, for they are barely present. The Spanish were the easier target. The rest of his Account of the Provinces continues to detail the establishment of English colonies and the initial upsets and phony threats made between the two countries. The system of administration used by the Spanish in Florida was also weak. It revolved around personal relationships between the natives and the clergy of the Catholic missions, which were considered by the throne to be the key to expansion. So, when the more secular system of colonization used by the English approached their borders and offered the natives an easier, alternative assimilation, the Spanish lost ground (i.e. Natives) quickly. The English knew they could subvert Spanish progress among Natives at low cost to themselves, and therefore saw them as an easy target, as opposed to France, which was operating in the same manner as England in the New World. Oglethorpe also warns his fellow countrymen, somewhat ironically, to be wary of the people that cry loudest for war. He recants the times of the War of Jenkin’s Ear, when everyone was clamoring to fight Spain, thinking they could be wiped out easily. The English lost that fight, including Mr. Oglethorpe’s thwarted siege of St. Augustine. He suggested, as an alternative, a plan devised by a contemporary of his which argues to drive northwards against the French. He thought that if England did this, they would have gained that much more in taxes from the natives they would have controlled. Even though Oglethorpe agreed that this was one of the more logical arguments for war, not against, it was still by nature impossible to carry out. He did not believe England is capable of successfully pursuing a war with France. Prior to my thesis, previous views on the topic were held by these historians whom I write with/against. Claude Sturgill, whose analysis of the situation between France, England and Spain shows the political economy as it was effected by imperialism. While explaining the politics, he shows also the interplay of the European forces with the natives, and how fears of competing alliances on all sides bred war. According to Charles Arnade, Spain’s control of Florida was subtle at best. As I said above, he states their control was based on personal relationships. Gradually, as it dawned on the Spanish that they could not control the entirety of the New World, their continent-wide claim shrank down to roughly the Florida we know of today. Despite this, the only place where the Spanish impact was felt by either the natives or the other European powers, was Pensacola in the west and St. Augustine in the east (with a coastal strip extending into Georgia), along with their respective hinterlands. From the start Florida was only kept as a safeguard to the gold fleets and less realistically, as the possible gateway to miraculous lands at the interior of the continent. Arnade also defines the weakness of Florida as the way it was governed. The crown never sent strong leadership to the region, with the result that the Catholic Church became the largest power broker. Their main objective was to save souls, and therefore they could only exert authority by winning natives over to Christianity and retaining them. Arnade shows that when the austere lifestyle of a Catholic convert was juxtaposed with what the English offered -namely cheap goods, firearms and liquor- the native Americans were easily won over to the English cause. While the end result of these relations ended up being my focus, I had to examine the entire history of the Spanish colony in order to fully grasp the attitudes held by France and England in the era of the Seven Year’s War. Spanish Florida was the easier target, if England absolutely needed one. And we must assume she does, for that was the political game at the time. The mercantilist imperialism dictated kill or be killed. So, by neglecting to mention Spain in an essay which talks with trepidation about war, he in fact says that they are easy pickings. Bibliography: Arnade, Charles W.. “The Failure of Spanish Florida.” The Americas 16 (Jan 1960): 271-281. Gold, Robert L.. Borderland Empires in Transition. Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969. Kimber, Edward. A Relation, or Journal of a late Epedition to the Gates of St. Augustine, on Florida. London: privately printed, 1744. Reprint, Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1976. Oglethorpe, James Edward. The Publications of James Edward Oglthorpe. Edited by Rodney M. Baine. A New and Accurate Account of the Provinces of South-Carolina and Georgia. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1994. Oglethorpe, James Edward. The Publications of James Edward Oglthorpe. Edited by Rodney M. Baine. The Naked Truth. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1994. Spalding, Phinizy. Oglethorpe in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Sturgill, Claude C., and E. R. Turner. “The Importance of Being at War: General James Oglethorpe’s Accounts and Imperial Affairs in Early Colonial Georgia.” Military Affairs 40 (Oct 1976): 129-135. |
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