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What do the speeches in Thucydides I-II.65 add to our understanding of the events he is describing?

Thucydides must have been a clairvoyant. He states that his work was ‘done to last forever’ (Book I.22). I do not think, however, that even a man of his intellect, despite observing that he just might be writing something ground-breaking, would have ever thought that nearly two and a half millennia later his work would be one of the most commented on and written about works in history. If you were to have told him in 429BC that historians one hundred generations later would asking questions like ‘Who was the real Thucydides?’ and describing him as the father of modern historical writing, he would have probably laughed, thanked you for the flattery and then promptly had you ostracised as a sycophant. Whether he himself would have agreed or not is a moot point because the fact remains that Thucydides of Athens is one of, if not the, most influential historians to date. His use of the year by year account along with the analytical style was revolutionary is something that many historians and students take for granted nowadays and it helped to make him a legend during his own lifetime. So much so that after his death, which is difficult to put a precise date on although it must have been not long after the end of the Peloponnesian War, with his work not yet complete several historians, including the pro-Spartan Xenophon of Athens and Theopompus of Chios, attempted to complete it but none could emulate the flawless Greek and free-flowing, enigmatic style of Thucydides. This is a testament to the man who not only made writing history fashionable in fourth century BC Greece, but who also invented the technique on which this essay is based – the reported speech.

In Book I.22, Thucydides sets out his stall and explains his usage of reproduced speeches. He openly admits that, even for someone of his mental capabilities, the remembering of the long speeches which were common in his time word for word was very difficult and on some occasions nearly impossible. He then describes the method he uses to construct these speeches – “to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation.” Several famous historians were to follow in Thucydides’ footsteps including Cornelius Tacitus, Titus Livius and a fellow Greek, Polybius, who, while he slated another historian, Timaeus’ use of reported speeches as “disregarding the truth” (Polybius, XII.25a)(something which Polybius himself was not entirely innocent of), would find it very difficult to refute the claim of P.G. Walsh that “it is not until the second century that a worthy successor to Thucydides appears in the person of Polybius”(Walsh, 1961, p22); in fact he would probably have been extremely proud of this high praise. In spite of Polybius’ dislike and other historians’ almost complete ignorance of this technique, in the centuries after Thucydides the reporting of speeches with words that were thought to suit the situation became the “salient feature of Roman historiography” and was even openly praised by Sallust and Julius Caesar (Walsh, 1961, p38).

In his short essay, The Speeches of Thucydides, Mark Munn begins with “no critical assessment of Thucydides can avoid the challenge of understanding his use of speeches”(2003). So what were the uses of these speeches? The first speech that is reported by Thucydides comes from Corcyraean representatives, made to the Athenian Assembly in 433BC asking for an alliance in response to the mobilising of the Corinthian fleet. Straight away, the Corcyraeans show humbleness and humility and plead to the Athenians’ sense of good will because they have done nothing for Athens in the past. They then state that they are ready to demonstrate their “gratitude can be depended upon”, but that they will “not be surprised if our mission ends in failure” (I.32).

They continue by admitting their error in trying to remain neutral, describing it “as a lack of foresight and as a source of weakness”. With this admission, they may have been attempting to prove their worthiness as allies. They then immediately play down their triumphs at Epidamnus and in the Ambracian Gulf against the Corinthians, with the hope of not making it appear that they can handle the Corinthians “single-handed”(I.32) and do not really need Athenian aid. In I.36, Thucydides delivers, from the mouth of the Corcyraean representative, what I think is the coup de gras, when he suggests that if Corinth was to defeat the Corcyraeans then the Athenians would “have to fight against the combined fleets of Corcyra and the Peloponnese.” Whoever uses this as the final point, Thucydides or the Corcyraean delegate, I think that it is the point that sways the Athenians towards accepting them as allies. The Athenians would have been extremely afraid of losing their naval superiority. Through this speech alone, Thucydides has been able to suggest the general feelings not only of the Corcyraeans but also of the Athenians. He has the delegates playing to Athenian pride and fear and this proves useful in showing how smaller states could flatter the superpowers into becoming involved in something seemingly outside their sphere of interest.

Thucydides then records the counter speech made by the Corinthian delegation and the reported speaker immediately levels accusations of duplicity at the Corcyraeans and regards their neutrality as no more than a front behind which they use “in order to give them a perfectly free hand to do wrong themselves”(I.37). They go further as to suggest that if the Corcyraeans will not act honourably or with loyalty to their mother city, why would they act any different to someone with whom they have had very little, if any, contact with before. They also reject the idea that an alliance between Corcyra and Athens would not be in contravention of the Thirty Year’s Peace, not because Corcyra is not part of the Peloponnesian League, but because the proposed alliance would be made “to injure other powers” (I.40) – namely Corinth herself.

This is important because the Corinthians are suggesting that by siding with Corcyra, Athens would be risking war with not just Corinth but with the entire Peloponnesian League including Sparta. Through Thucydides, the Corinthians appear to be trying to call Athens’ bluff with regard to the initiating of a Pan-Hellenic conflict. Ultimately, it is the Athenians who take a gamble that pays off and Corinth is humiliated again by her colony at the battle of Sybota, which is overseen by a small Athenian fleet. Thucydides expresses the Corinthian outrage at this interference in her affairs in a small speech (I.53) given to the Athenian fleet as the Corinthians try to pass. They threaten the Athenians with out right war but again nothing comes of it. However, it is difficult to underestimate the importance of these opening speeches and to disagree that “the arguments which Thucydides has put in their mouths express clearly the bearings of the situation and the importance of the decision for Athens” (Bury + Meiggs, 1987, p245).

The next speeches reported by Thucydides along with his narrative show us that the situation has become a lot more volatile. Following the siege of Potidaea and the issuing of the merciless Megarian Decree in 432BC, the Peloponnesian League held an assembly at Sparta so the allies could air their grievances. Chief among the agitators were again the Corinthians and were this time backed up by the Megarians, who faced economic ruin by not being allowed to trade with the Athenian Empire. Thucydides records the opening speech of the Corinthians and immediately the anger of Corinth can be seen as the delegates speak of Athens’ “insolent aggression” and complains to Sparta “for her neglect of our advice” (I.68). The tirade against Sparta continues as the Corinthians attack her for not acting over the Corcyraean affair and the siege of Potidaea, saying “and it is you who are responsible for all this” (Book I.69). They then give a brief overview of Athenian imperialism and how it has made the men of Athens “incapable of either living a quiet life themselves or of allowing anyone else to do so.” This is a ferocious speech aimed not just at the Athenians, but also at the idleness of the Spartans, and through Thucydides, clearly portrays the anger and passion felt by the Corinthians and would have a great impact on those who were attending the Debate, and those who were at the Peloponnesian League Assembly, where the Corinthians make a similarly passionate speech, full of ideas on how the Athenian Empire could be brought to its knees.

The response to this violent dialogue is delivered in a very calm manner by the Athenian delegates, despite that fact that it is full of self-glorifying statements about the Athenian courage during the Persian Wars – “the courage, the daring that we showed were without parallel”(I.74) – and that from that courage Athenian pre-eminence was a natural progression and the gathering of an empire was well-deserved. A comparison is drawn between Athenian dominance in the Aegean Sea to the Spartan leadership of the Peloponnesian League and the Lacedaemonians “arranged the affairs of the various states so as to suit yourselves” (I.76), much like the Athenians were being accused of. They also say that if war comes about that it will be entirely the fault of the Spartans (I.78). The importance of this speech I think is the calmness with which it seems to have been delivered. The Athenians come off as extremely confident in their ultimate victory in any struggle that may break out.

The debate at Sparta is brought to a close with the speeches of King Archidamus and Sthenelaidas, one of the Spartan ephors. These two speeches show the direct contrast in the thoughts of the Spartans. While King Archidamus warns about the dangers of a war against a force as powerful as the Athenian Empire, Sthenelaidas is openly calling for a pre-emptive strike against the “aggressor” (I.86). Through Thucydides, we can see that Archidamus was an intelligent man and understood these dangers and that if war were to be declared then it would be foolish to rush headlong into a conflict without preparation. Also in a later speech that the Spartan King gives to a council of Peloponnesian generals, we see that, while he had earlier spoken against war, he was now leading the allied army into battle, as a true Spartan would do. These speeches are rare as they come from Spartan mouths and are very important to us because they not only show the Spartan leadership of the Peloponnesian League, but they also show a possible conflict between the ruling elite in Laconia.

With the exception of Archidamus’ address to the allied generals before the first invasion of Attica, the last three speeches up until Book II.65 are made by Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus - “the leading man of his time among the Athenians and the most powerful both in action and in debate” (I.139 + Rawlings, 1981, p122). His first speech is in reply to the Spartan ultimatum ordering Athens to raise the siege of Potidaea, to give Aegina her independence and to rescind the Megarian Decree. He immediately disregards the ultimatum and states that he is against any concessions, unless something is given in return and suggests that if Athens is to give independence to her allies then Sparta must do the same. Much like the Athenian delegates did during the Debate at Sparta, Pericles blames Sparta for the present situation and accuses her of “plotting” (I.140) against Athens and ultimately bringing war closer and closer. It is in this speech that Pericles also introduces his famous idea that Athens is an island (I.143) and should act like one, using their fleet and Long Walls to protect them from anything that the Peloponnesian League could throw at them. While this idea of Athens being an island is probably the highlight of the speech it would be easy to overlook the confidence shown by Pericles, again much like the Athenians at the Spartan Assembly.

The last Periclean speech in this section of the Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is an address given after the second Spartan invasion of Attica and the onset of the plague in Athens. The combination of these two events along with the lack of a significant military or naval victory had disenchanted the Athenian public, who turned their anger towards Pericles, blaming him for the situation they were in. Pericles responds to the growing anxiety and, while he shows his affinity with the Athenian people by sharing in their plight, he almost shames the populace into realising that this war will be to the finish and that they will have to stick it out. He then bolsters their confidence by saying that if the Athenians are united behind the ability and power of their fleet that no one, “not the King of Persia nor any people under the sun” (II.62) would be able to stop them. He urges them not to bow to the Spartans despite their “present suffering” but to continue on and show the Greek world that Athens is the “greatest in Hellas” (II.64). This speech again shows the brilliance that we have come to expect from Pericles, but despite this later in 430BC, he was deposed from the board of generals and made to pay a fine, only to be restored as strategos before the end of the year.

Probably the most famous speech of Pericles takes place during this section of Thucydides’ work and I have decided to leave it to the end. It was essentially a Funeral Oration, which was traditionally given when the bones of those killed in the first year of war are being buried publicly. Pericles was chosen to give the speech and, along with the basis of a normal funeral oration although he does leave out several of the main topics, he adds in a long section on the superiority of the Athenian people. He calls Athens “an education to Greece” (II.41) and declares that all other Greek cities should aim to be like her. The whole crux of this Oration is the “greatness of Athens” (II.43) and he goes into the great detail to express this notion. Unfortunately, while this speech is delivered with great passion and at the time would have had a widespread impact in Athens, Pericles could not have foreseen the horror that was to strike Athens the following year – the plague. Even a ‘superior race’ such as the Athenians could not conflict what could be conceived as the will of the gods, something that Pericles leaves out of his Oration. As a speech the Funeral Oration ranks highly but the events that followed probably nullified much of its effect.

In conclusion, I think it is difficult to look at how Thucydides’ speeches, as a whole, help our understanding of the events because contained within Book I-II.65 are very different. The prelude to war speeches, especially those of the Corinthians, show us the feelings of the main combatants, many of whom did not really want war but in the circumstances found it either necessary or unavoidable. While the speeches of the Corinthians, the Corcyraeans, the Athenians and the Spartans help us to understand events that were taking place, the speeches of Pericles give us a belief. The belief that the Athenians were superior to all others be they Corinthians, Spartans or Persians, and that Athens and her allies would defeat any Peloponnesian League army or navy. Personally, I think that because of their value as sources of fact the speeches of the Corinthians, who are one of the main provocateurs of the Peloponnesian War, and those given at the Debate in Sparta, are the more important speeches of this section of Thucydides’ work. While those of Pericles give us the state of mind of a mid-fifth century Athenian they do not give us enough information that would be trustworthy because in the end they are propaganda. However, when you consider all of the speeches as a whole, they paint a fuller picture of what really happened up until the beginning of and the first two years of what Thucydides calls “a great war” that would involve “the whole of mankind” (I.1).

Bibliography

Primary Sources

History of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides


The Rise of the Roman Empire Polybius (commentary by F.W. Walbank, 1979)


Secondary Sources

The Origins of the Peloponnesian War G.E.M. de Ste Croix
(1972)

Livy: Methods and Aims P.G. Walsh
(1961)

The Structure of Thucydides’ History H.R. Rawlings III
(1981)

The History of Greece J.B. Bury + R. Meiggs (1987)

The Speeches in Thucydides M. Munn
(www.apaclassics.org) (2003)

What do the speeches in Thucydides I-II.65 add to our understanding of the events he is describing?

Diocletian and the Great Persecution