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An Examination of Kautilya's Arthaśāstra, Part One
Associated to Place: AncientWorlds > The Orient > India > Mohenjo-Daro > articles -- by * Sankira Qin (12 Articles), Historical Article
Kautilya or Chanakya, sometimes called India's Machievelli or even the Indian Sun-tzu, was the principle advisor to King Chandragupta Maurya of India (c. 317-293 BCE). The advice he set down in his book the Arthaśāstra was instrumental in helping the king conquer the Indian subcontinent establish the Mauryan Empire.

All but unknown in the West, the Arthaśāstra by Kautilya (Chanakya), is considered one of the greatest political works of the ancient world. Written nearly three centuries before the birth of Christ, the famous Nineteenth Century sociologist Max Weber said of it, “compared to it, Machiavelli’s The Prince is harmless.”¹ In it, Kautilya expressed the desire for his king to conquer the world and to aid in that goal he offered an analysis of which kingdoms he considered natural allies and which inevitable enemies, gave advice on who should be attacked and when, how to treat defeated enemy soldiers and citizens, when to make and break treaties, and even described a calculated willingness to make use of assassination, which he called “silent war”, as a legitimate means to achieve victory. He advocated the use of secret agents, not only for assassinations, but to sow discord among enemy leaders; he viewed women as one of the most effective weapons of war — especially in the rôle of secret agent; believed in the use of either religion or superstition to inspire his own troops and demoralize the enemy’s, and heartily approved of the spread of disinformation.

Kautilya might easily be called the Sun-tzu of India. He held the position of key advisor (or prime minister) to King Chandragupta Maurya of India (c. 317-293 BCE), a post comparable to that which Bismark held in Germany at the end of the Nineteenth Century. By his own words, he wrote his masterpiece in order to show a wise king how to defeat his enemies, an aim that was apparently successful since – as his near-contemporary Qin Shihuang-di would accomplish in China nearly a century later – Chandragupta became the first ruler ever to unite the Indian subcontinent into a single empire. So, was Kautilya hero or unscrupulous villain? Without the measures he advocated, would it (as some believe) have been impossible to bring order out of the chaos of warring states? Could the way have been cleared for the emergence of a leader such as Chandragupta’s grandson Ashoka, who is regarded by many as one of the finest kings in world history, by gentler means? To answer that question, we must take a step back from our Twenty-first Century mores and examine the times in which Kautilya lived.

The Mauryan Empire

Chandragupta and Kautilya began their conquest of India only a few years after Alexander the Great’s death in 323 BCE. Using the principles laid down in the Arthaśāstra, they defeated the Nanda kings, who had ruled for a century thru the maintenance of a huge army and heavy taxation. Their next objective was to stop Alexander’s successors, especially General Seleucus in Babylon, from invading western India. They accomplished this by assassinating the Greek governors Nicanor and Philip. Taking Punjab and Sindh from the Greeks, stopping the invasion of India, and forcing Seleucus to sign a treaty allowed them to complete their conquest. Once the treaty was concluded, virtually the entire subcontinent had been unified under Chandragupta’s rule, the Greeks had established an envoy at the king’s court, and Chandragupta was married to Seleucus’s daughter.

The Mauryan Empire may have been the first large centralized government that India had known, but according to contemporary sources it was very well run. Despite the autocratic nature of the upper layers of power, there appears to have been real democracy at the city and village level. Megasthenes was the Greek ambassador to Chandragupta’s court in Pataliputra (present day Patna in Bihar). In his book Indica he described the prosperity of Mauryan cities, including abundant water, plentiful minerals, and a healthy agricultural output. Although nothing of the original Indica survives today, it is widely quoted in the works of contemporary Greek and Roman travelers. According to one such source, Megasthenes is quoted as writing that,  “the Indians … dressed in bright and rich colors … [and] they liberally used ornaments and gems.”

After Chandragupta’s death, the empire continued under his son Bindusara and then his grandson Ashoka. Kautilya’s advice is seen by many modern-day scholars as radical and without morality, however, many more argue that the extreme measures advocated by Kautilya (some of which surely must have been used by Chandragupta) were necessary to the times in which he lived. In any era, it’s necessary for a leader to look to the actual workings of the politics of others to determine how his administration should act and react. Indian historians often point out that the Arthaśāstra is a “practical book of rugged political realism…that actually shaped history”² as opposed to the “impotent idealism” of Plato. D.D. Kosambi put it this way: “The Greeks make excellent reading; the Indian treatise [Arthaśāstra] worked infinitely better in practice for its own time and place.”³ In other words, the book concerns itself with political realism. It analyzes how politics actually work and only occasionally comments on how they ought to work.

As Kautilya intended, the Arthaśāstra explains in plain terms the often brutal measures a king must carry out to preserve the state and the common good, from dealings with other kings to the daily schedule a king should require of himself. Chandragupta found himself in a situation where the old order was crumbling. The confederation of Nanda kings had proven inept and cruel. Enemies were encroaching on India’s borders and anarchy was looming. Given this, were such harsh measures necessary? I believe they were.

The Science of Politics

Although Kautilya did discuss practical suggestions for classical warfare such as “[the] destruction of an enemy’s forces is principally dependent on elephants” and mountain forts are preferable to river forts because they are “easy to protect, difficult to lay siege to, difficult to climb,” we will be concerning ourselves with his suggestions regarding the machinations of politics outside the battlefield.

The title Arthaśāstra has been translated as “the science of politics”, “the science of polity”, and “the science of political economy”. Heinrich Zimmer calls it the “timeless laws of politics, economy, diplomacy, and war.” 4 However you translate it, its stated aim was to help the king “in the acquisition and protection of the earth.” Since he was attempting to describe a means by which one might conquer the world, Kautilya considered the idea of a passive, trusting, superstitious view of the world as ridiculous. “One trusting in fate,” he writes, “being devoid of human endeavor, perishes . . . The object slips away from the foolish person who continuously consults the stars…what will the stars do?”5 Kautilya’s policy was one of action, and by urging his king to rely on science and not religion, he became one of the first to separate church from state.

Why, you may ask, should Kautilya want his king to conquer the world? Before examining that question, we should understand that much of what Kautilya wrote indicates that when he said “conquering the world” what he meant was to conquer that land which the ancient Indians believed were the natural borders of India. In other words, the land bordered in the north by the Himalayas down to the Indian Ocean, and from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal. In the Indian tradition, a world conqueror or cakravārtin did not conquer “regions beyond the borders of India.” And India did not include the land of mlecchas (barbarians) or those outside the Indian culture. So as we continue, remember that, based upon in Kautilya’s point of view, India was “the world.”

So, back to our question. The foreign policy described in the Arthaśāstra, is probably better applied to a collection of small warring states than to the great empire the Mauryans eventually created. But remember that Kautilya grew up in an atmosphere of small warring states and appears to have believed that peaceful empires are not meant to last. On the contrary, warring states in perpetual conflict was a more normal state of world affairs. Therefore, world conquest was the only sure road to peace.

Relations between countries, according to Kautilya, falls under three categories: “…there is open war, concealed war, and silent war.” Open war consisted of meeting one’s enemy on the battlefield. Concealed war would most likely equate to the modern term guerilla warfare. Silent war, however, was how countries dealt with one another during all other times.

As a realist, he believed that every nation acts to maximize its own interests and power. Alliances were only good as long as they were in the best interest of both parties. However, as soon as the balance of power shifts, allies may become enemies…and enemies may become allies. Since this is the natural order and to be expected, it is only responsible of the king to maintain his own kingdom’s best interest at heart when dealing with foreign powers, be they friend or foe. One retains an ally, not because of goodwill or a moral obligation, but due to one’s strength, the use of which can advance both one’s own self-interest as well as that of an ally. “…when one has an army, one’s ally remains friendly, or the enemy becomes friendly.” The fact that countries act in their own self-interest was a timeless principle of Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra.

Treaties were meant for states of equal power. Having an ally is good, yes, but alliances only last as long as they are in the ally’s self-interest. The strength of any kingdom could change abruptly due any number of unforeseen events, such as famine or earthquake. Should a kingdom be weakened by calamity, it would become ripe for conquest. Because of this, even times of peace had the potential to erupt into warfare. Therefore, it was only right that the king should be prepared for such an eventuality.

Remember, Kautilya wrote this a century after Thucydides had given the world the History of the Peloponnesian War and several decades after Callicles and Thrasymachus told Plato that rule by the stronger was natural.6 In this, he apparently agreed with them. In the world of international politics, he claimed, it is only natural that nations would interact with one another through dissension and force. Nor did he see conquest as unjust. On the contrary, he believed that a king who carried out his duties, ruled according to the law, protected his people, handed down only just pronouncements, and applied the rules equally to “his son or his enemy” would “conquer the world up to its four ends.”

The only moral consideration in Kautilya’s theories is that the king should do what is best for his own people. He lived in a world where one either conquered or was conquered. This to Kautilya was simply the nature of power. The king “should march when by marching he would be able to weaken or exterminate the enemy.” And the enemy in his view was anyone who was not a subject. Furthermore, he believed that every other nation would act in a like manner. “…even the equal who has achieved his object tends to be stronger, and when augmented in power, untrustworthy; prosperity tends to change the mind.”

This is not to say he believed nations never or should never act altruistically. On the contrary, he advocated the humanitarian treatment of conquered soldiers and citizens, as this coincided with the conqueror’s own interest—as we shall see later. Kautilya simply assumed that, given enough power, one’s allies will eventually act in their own interests…which might not match yours. It would be a betrayal of his people for the king not to assume the worst-case scenario and be prepared for it. Any nation that relies on the kindness of its neighbors is weak and will eventually be destroyed. This same belief can be found in Thucydides and in the works of Chinese legalist Han Fei Tzu (who wrote half a century after Kautilya).

The political science outlined in the Arthaśāstra was aimed entirely at conquering one’s enemy and his territory. This brought more wealth to the kingdom, allowing the king to raise more armies and conquer more territory with the ultimate goal of conquering the world. So how to accomplish this? It all depends on the strength of the enemy. This meant one must deal with one’s various neighbors according to their strengths and weaknesses. Naturally, the most important step to conquering weaker enemies was to raise successful armies and here wealth was the key, although by this he meant a method of paying for weapons, chariots, and elephants, as well as keeping the soldiers fed, well-paid, and happy. It did not mean the purchasing of mercenaries, who Kautilya considered unreliable. But for stronger enemies, there was the outlet of diplomacy.

The goal of Kautilya’s science was power, for “power is strength” and “strength changes the mind.” This seems to indicate that he believed the more powerful his king became, the more likely it would be that he could affect not only the actions, but the actual views (and possibly loyalties) of those with whom he dealt—both subjects and enemies. The king’s first and foremost goal must be to destroy his enemies and protect his own people. Even more than that, it was his duty to bring his subjects the “three goods of life”, namely material gain, spiritual good, and pleasure. “In the happiness of his subjects lies the King's happiness, in their welfare his welfare. He shall not consider as good only that which pleases him but treats as beneficial to him whatever pleases his subjects.” 7

The Mandala Theory or Who do we attack first?

Kautilya believed that countries which shared a common border were natural enemies—conquerors come if not from, then through the country next door. However, any state on the other side of that enemy is a natural choice for an ally for they, too, are at risk from the same enemy. In other words, he believed in the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The idea is best envisioned by a series of concentric circles (not a normal configuration of states, admittedly, but easier to describe), which actually makes them look a bit like a mandala, hence the name. Envisioning your own country at the center (number one) and moving outward, countries 3, 5, 7, and 9 would be natural allies while 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 would probably be enemies or “unfriendly elements”.

As mentioned earlier, however, allies were only “friendly” temporarily. Should country 3 conquer country 2, the entire configuration might change overnight. So, let’s begin by examining Kautilya’s views on diplomacy.

Carl von Clausewitz maintained that war is an extension of domestic policy. Kautilya said that diplomacy is a subtle act of war. It should be used to give the king time to “strike again and again” with an eye toward weakening the enemy and gaining advantage to oneself in preparation for eventual conquest. Since Kautilya’s world was one of conquer or be conquered, rather than “prepare for war, but hope for peace”, he advocated, “prepare for war and plan to conquer.” In such an atmosphere, diplomacy was just another weapon in a kingdom’s arsenal. This meant there were only three classifications for foreign states: potential enemies, vulnerable enemies, and enemies fit to be exterminated.

Potential Enemies

Potential enemies were those to whom one showed a friendly face. They might be your ally or there might be no particular relationship between your country and theirs. But eventually, they would become enemies. Or so Kautilya assumed. After all, his politics were aimed at conquering the world, which can only be done by taking control of all other territories, most of which will fight to retain control.

Let’s assume that Country 2 is an enemy too powerful to take on immediately. In such a case, it would be in the king’s best interest to be friendly toward them until they grew weaker. But Kautilya didn’t suggest the king sit passively by and wait for this to happen. Instead, it was his duty to make it happen. And, since states always act in their own self-interest, moral principles and obligations carry little or no weight in the actions between states.

“A neighboring prince possessed of the excellences of an enemy is the foe; one in calamity is vulnerable; one without support or with weak support is fit to be exterminated; in the reverse case, fit to be harassed or weakened. These are the different types of enemies.”

When Kautilya described exterminating an enemy, he meant killing only the leaders. He believed that the best policy toward enemy soldiers and citizens was to treat them well…and then recruit them. A conquered people are much more likely to look favorably on the conqueror if he acts benevolently toward them. Act despotically and you lose the support of the people.

In this, Kautilya was unique. Most countries of the day believed in a strict delineation between warriors and common folk. Kautilya pointed out that “If weak in might, a king should endeavor to secure the welfare of his subjects. The countryside is the source of all undertakings. From them comes might.” For his day, this was a revolutionary statement. India was divided into four classes: kshatriyas or the warrior and ruling class, brahmins or priests; vaishyas meaning farmers or merchants; and shūdras, agricultural laborers. Kautilya appears to have had little use for brahmins, since he wrote “by prostration, an enemy may win over Brahmana troops.” But he was taken by the energy, strength, and numbers of the shūdras. “As between land with the support of a fort and one with the support of men, the one with the support of men is preferable. For a kingdom is that which has men. Without men, like a barren cow, what could it yield?”

He does seem to have preferred an army of kshatriyas – the Greek ambassador to Chandragupta’s court notes that nearly one-fifth of the population were of this class – but in times of emergency, he would prefer the balance of the army come from the two lower classes of society. He also believed that units should be composed of “men from the same region, caste or profession”, since an army composed of brothers and friends fighting for each other is more difficult to defeat.

It is better to attack an enemy that is disunited rather than one in which the citizens have organized themselves into “bands.” So, the first obstacle to overcome is to breakdown the enemy’s trust and reliance on each other. For this task, Kautilya advocated spies and secret agents who could exploit the divisions within a country and hopefully widen such gaps. Every country, according to Kautilya, has four types of disgruntled citizens: the enraged, the frightened, the greedy, and the proud. Secret agents should be employed to fan the flames of their discontent. The king should win over the seducible by “means of conciliation and gifts and those not seducible by means of dissension and force.”

He sought to provoke wars between neighboring states and their allies, which would weaken both. At the very least, to drive a wedge between them, leaving one possibly weak enough for “extermination.”  For countries that tried to remain neutral, he suggested ways of provoking a potential war between them and a neighboring state. Then, should the neutral nation seek his king’s help, it could be “placed under obligations.” Here again, Kautilya shows no moral qualms about breaking such obligations, for “that ally who might do harm or who, though capable, would not help in times of troubles, he should exterminate him, when trustingly, he comes within his reach.” (My emphasis)


1 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Weber: Selections in Translation. Ed. W. G. Runciman, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

2 Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” in The Journal of Military History. Ed. Bruce Vandervort (Society for Military History: Jan. 2003, Vol 67, No.1).

3 D. D. Kosambi, The Culture and Civilisation of Ancient India (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1994).

4 Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

5 Boesche, Ibid, pg. 16.

6 Kautilya, Arthaśāstra, 2nd Edition. Trans. R.P. Kangle.

7 Ibid

8 Ibid

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Posted Nov 25, 2004 - 15:16 , Last Edited: Nov 26, 2004 - 02:56











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