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Why did Hannibal lose the Second Punic War?

Introduction

The end was near. They were coming for him. Hannibal Barca knew that if he was ever captured he would face the humiliating spectacle of a Roman triumph culminating in public execution, and so by taking his own life in a remote country villa on the shores of the Black Sea in Bithynia he eluded his implacable foes one last time . It is easy to understand why the Romans wanted to hunt down the sixty-four year old soldier-statesman. The masterminding of the naval victory of his host King Prusias over the Roman ally Pergamum had rekindled memories of how Hannibal had led his Carthaginian army from Spain, through France, into Italy across the Alps, a feat deemed impossible for the time of year. Once there, he used Roman territory as his own personal battlefield destroying his enemies with seemingly “contemptuous ease” . His victories at the Trebia, Lake Trasimene and especially Cannae became famous throughout the world and are still studied today for their revolutionary battlefield tactics. However, despite the fame his sixteen-year campaign in Italy brought him, Hannibal was eventually forced to pull out of Roman territory to protect his African homeland from the other famous general of the Second Punic War, Publius Cornelius Scipio, later known as Africanus. The two titans met on the barren plains of Zama, some “five days’ march” from Qart Hadasht, where Hannibal was defeated in a decisive encounter which was to help shape the future of the Mediterranean.

For Rome it meant the first step on the road to world power whereas for Carthage it began a series of events that would end fifty-eight years later in her oblivion. It was a spectacular fall from grace for the kingdom fashioned from the hide of an ox by Queen Elishat in 814BC , over half a century before the fratricide Romulus founded his city on the Tiber. It had nearly been so very different. This piece aims to assess how and why Carthage lost the Second Punic War by looking at the weaknesses of the Punii, her allies and her generals and comparing them with the strengths of the Roman Republic, her alliance system and her handful of capable commanders. Together these to powers fought what was possibly the greatest conflict of the ancient world and the reasons behind the victory of one of the most influential civilisations ever and the defeat of one of the greatest leaders and most innovative battlefield tacticians the world has ever known are vital to our understanding of such a pivotal time in European and world history.

Sources for the Hannibalic War

Polybius of Megalopolis (c.200-118BC)

I realise that on a subject like Hannibal and the Second Punic War it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to come up with an original interpretation of the events, not just because of the amount of work already published on the subject, but because of the lack of contemporary evidence. This scarcity of sources, apart from “a few coins and a limited amount of archaeological material” , is a great tragedy for the study of such an important period in the history of Europe. We are fortunate that the writings of Polybios have survived somewhat intact. This professional historian was a near contemporary of the Second Punic War, born in the last years of the third century BC. His family was very influential in the Peloponnesian city of Megalopolis with his father, Lykortas, serving as the strategos of the Achaean League. Polybios himself was hipparchos of the League during Rome’s war with King Perseus of Macedonia and was transported to Rome to serve as a political hostage, a sentence that was to last for sixteen years. During his captivity he attracted the attention of the eighteen year-old Scipio Aemilianus. Becoming the “friend and adviser” to the young Aemilianus gave Polybios access to eyewitnesses from both sides of the war and by accompanying his patron on military campaigns to Spain, Africa and Greece, he saw places directly affected by the war . This would have included areas where Hannibal had left his mark including the famous Lacinian inscription he set up on what is now Cape Colonne near Crotone detailing the size and composition of his army .

The history that he produced was separated into forty books of which five survive intact with a large number of fragments meaning that we have about a third of the entire work . In spite of only this fraction being available, what is left fills a large void in Roman history, charting the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean from the First Punic War to the Third Macedonian War. Despite his Roman backing and use of Roman archives, Polybios shows a useful objectivity with no specific pro- or anti-Roman bias. However, it is conspicuous that despite this impartiality he decided to leave certain controversial matters out, most notably the situation of Saguntum’s status with regard to the Ebro Treaty. This neutrality is thanks in no small part to the range of sources that Polybios employed. This included two men, Sosylos of Sparta and Silenus of Kaleakte, who according to Cornelius Nepos, both accompanied Hannibal on his journey . Polybios also mentions the Roman historian Q. Fabius Pictor , the pro-Carthaginian Philinus of Agrigentum and another Sicilian, Timaeus of Tauromenium, who is on the receiving end of a tirade from the great historian . Polybios may well have used several other sources and a cross-referencing of figures for Hannibal’s army with the Roman praetor for Sicily, L. Cincius Alimentus, who was held prisoner by Hannibal and thought to have conversed with the general about the size of his army , cannot be ruled out.

When it comes to reading his work, Polybios comes across as “pedantic” , but nevertheless one cannot help admiring his Thucydidean respect for precision and analysis. His accounts of set piece battles, described by F.J. Lazenby as “the best which have survived from antiquity” , and his insights into the way men thought overshadowing his mistakes on geography, regarding Cartagena , his identifying of L. Cornelius Scipio as Africanus’s elder brother and his own prejudices. Despite never being considered a great historian in antiquity, Polybios has become so well respected that he has been described as the “worthy extant successor to Thucydides” and the “first real historian of the ancient world.”


Titus Livius (c.59BC – AD17)

Of the scant sources on the mid-republic, our only companion to Polybios is Livy. Born Titus Livius at Patavium in the middle of the first century BC, his work Ab Urbe Condita, chronicled the history of Rome from its foundation to around 9BC, a period of 744 years. It was an enormous work of 142 books of which only thirty-five survive intact, including books XXI to XXX, which detail the war against Hannibal. With the patronage of the emperor Augustus, Livy had access to the masses of official documents, treaties and histories stored in the huge libraries of Rome. Livy’s work utilizes many contemporary historians, with several mentioned by name; Q. Fabius Pictor , Cincius Alimentus , Silenos of Kaleakte , Valerius Antias , L. Coelius Antipater and Polybios, who is used extensively but only mentioned once by name. Livy would have been unable to question people who had taken part in the war, but by using Polybios as a major source he allows us to fill in the gaps of the surviving fragments of The Histories.

Unfortunately, the nature of Livy’s work is extremely pro-Roman and he blames Carthage and Hannibal completely for starting the Second Punic War. Even though there was a big difference between the politics of the mid-republic and those of the Augustan principate, Livy spent much of his time comparing his own period to that of the Hannibalic War, which he saw as the high point of Roman skill, morality and imperialism . He disliked the Rome of his time due to the moral degeneration of his people through the influence of foreign luxury and Greek culture. Livy sought to explain the new order and save his generation by championing the past, as Cicero did. He assigns the Roman victory over Hannibal to the cohesion of the Senate, the people and the acquiescence of powerful generals to the greater good. He gives a lot of credit to the Italian allies as well, praising their loyalty and willingness to obey their superiors.

This obvious partiality makes it easy to criticise Livy when compared with Polybios, especially when you take into account Livy’s lack of experience in politics and warfare and the fact that he did not visit the historical sites of the war . He fails to evaluate his sources, putting too much stock in pro-Roman literature, and utilizes the information for an entire event before questioning its usefulness. However, his style of writing is far easier to read than Polybios’s and does on occasion recognise Roman exaggeration . Livy shows his worth when Polybios’s text is incomplete or, on rare occasions, doubtable, by filling in the gaps and in places enriching our understanding of the events, especially when it comes to his accuracy over the victors of consular elections, the disposition of the legions and the Roman political scene in general. It is this exactness that is probably Livy’s greatest strength and he may have used the Annales Maximi of P. Mucius Scaevola to obtain this degree of accuracy . Without Livy, our understanding of the events of the Second Punic War would be a lot cloudier.



Mestrios Plutarchos (c.AD46 – 120)

Livy is not the only ancient writer who can be described as a moralist. One of the last “classical Greek historians” , Mestrios Plutarchos is well known for his collection of essays and treatises, commonly identified as the Moralia, but is even more well known for his Parallel Lives of prominent Greeks and Romans. A scholar of great learning, Plutarch used his bioi to give object lessons, hoping to improve the moral standards of the Roman Empire of his time. Lives of several important men who played a major role on the Roman side during the Second Punic War like Fabius Maximus, Cato the Censor and Marcellus are included in the bioi. However, the most important life from the Hannibalic War, apart from Hannibal himself, that of Scipio Africanus, does not survive and is a great loss to the study of the time period.


Appian of Alexandria (c. AD90 – 160)

Another historian from whom we can extract some extra information, especially with regards to numbers and army sizes, is Appian of Alexandria. Writing in the second century AD, the Greek historian compiled a history of Rome but did so in a different style to most others. He divided his subject into two categories, the first being the major events involving Rome (i.e. the Hannibalic War) and the second being geographical regions (i.e. The History of Spain – Iberike). However, it is his geography that makes students wary of Appian, who apparently thought that the Ebro flows into the Atlantic and also his account of the battle of Cannae “bears little or no resemblance to those of Polybios or Livy, and hardly makes sense in itself” .


Hannibal’s Aims and Methods

Hannibalic Blitzkrieg?

It is very difficult to extrapolate Hannibal’s specific military aims as he set out from Cartagena in June 218BC. We have virtually nothing from the Carthaginian general himself apart from the bronze tablet at the Temple of Hera on the Lacinian promontory and some reported quotations, including his alleged advice to Antiochus of the Seleucid Empire to invade Italy . This advice gives us an insight into how Hannibal saw any defeat of Rome even though it had not worked for him. According to Hannibal, any invader had to find a way of winning over Italians or at least ensuring their neutrality. Exactly what Hannibal’s proposed design on how to achieve this has been argued over in recent years. He intended to threaten Rome by taking the fight to her and winning victories on Italian soil, but does this mean that Hannibal thought that by adopting a blitzkrieg method of attack and winning a few victories he could break the indefatigable spirit of Rome? He had no doubt studied the First Punic War, during which Rome had suffered several serious setbacks both on land and at sea yet had still prevailed. If he had learned any lessons from his father about Romans, surely it would have been that the Roman Republic was an immensely obstinate and resilient power.

The quick succession of Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae suggest that Hannibal did think he could end the war quickly. However, the idea that “Hannibal had to win his war quickly or nor at all” can be explained that by repeatedly sending armies against him, the Romans gave Hannibal little choice. He had to fight if he wanted to make a significant impact on Rome’s more important allies in Campania. Something that also detracts from the idea of blitzkrieg is the state of the Carthaginian army following the historic, winter crossing of the Alps. After such an exhausting undertaking surely Hannibal would have preferred longer to replenish his supplies and rest his army before being pressured into action along the River Po by Scipio. The fracas on the Ticinus was no more than a cavalry skirmish and battle on the Trebia was not joined until Hannibal thought that the situation was favourable to him and that if he wanted to proceed further the obstructing army of Scipio would have to be dealt with. This does not seem to be an example of blitzkrieg offence but more like a first-rate general picking his moment where he could do the most damage whilst suffering few casualties.

It is possible to point to the battles of Lake Trasimene and Cannae and say that these are evidence of Hannibal going all out for total victory, but these may be cases of opportunism being mistaken for blitzkrieg. Hannibal had spent much of 217BC trying to evade two large Roman armies that were trying to surround him, while also preventing them joining together. On the shores of Lake Trasimene, he saw a perfect opportunity to rid himself of one of the pursuing forces. His army ambushed and annihilated the consular army of C. Flaminius in the morning mist killing almost 15,000 Roman soldiers . At Cannae, it could be said that to face a double consular army of over 80,000 men with less than 50,000 of his own would be a reckless manoeuvre on Hannibal’s part. However, he again showed his ingenuity and opportunism in the face of an army desperate to win a decisive battle. Utilising his strength in cavalry, his Numidian and Celtic flanks routed the Roman horse on both sides of the battlefield before falling on the rear of the advancing legions while Hannibal himself led a fighting withdrawal in the centre with his veterans. This total envelopment of the Roman lines led to the biggest casualties on one day of fighting until World War I as as many as 73,000 Romans were either killed or captured. Hannibal’s Italian offensive, while on the surface a ferocious blitzkrieg that hoped to destroy any Roman army in its path, underneath was a lot more controlled and methodical than it has been remembered.


War of Attrition?

Hannibal would only be drawn into a contest when he needed to or when the situation was distinctly in his favour. Did this mean that he was not planning a war of attrition? He recognised that Rome’s strengths “were an inexhaustible supply of provisions and manpower” and by invading Italy he hoped to disrupt this supply. Depriving Rome of these resources to wear her down, whilst an integral part of his strategy, was not the only advantage of invasion. With Roman control of the sea apparent to both sides and the large distances for any supplies or reinforcements to reach him from Carthaginian territory, Hannibal depended on fighting his war on Roman resources. Instead of having to maintain difficult supply routes with Africa or Spain, he could gain additional forces and feed his army by “persuading as many of her (Rome’s) Italian and Latin allies as possible to defect.” If this strategy worked well enough, the manpower and food supplies available to Rome would be available in some part to the Carthaginians and the planning for this suggests that Hannibal was prepared for the long haul. It is difficult to see Hannibal’s strategy as clear-cut enough to simply call it a ‘blitzkrieg’ or a ‘war of attrition’. The crux of his strategy lies somewhere in between, incorporating elements of both. He hoped to deprive Rome of some of her supplies using them for his own ends; however, he still remained vigilant for any opportunity to deliver a devastating blow taking calculated risks on the battlefield . This combination of strategic and tactical planning was beyond anything Rome had ever faced and would prove very difficult to defeat.

In a conflict between two powers the size of Rome and Carthage, it was rare for one side to destroy its opponent completely and Hannibal probably never entertained the idea of capturing Rome itself. If so, then how did he envisage the war ending? The continued existence of Rome after her defeat is alluded to in Hannibal’s alliance with Philip V of Macedon in 215BC and the address supposedly given to the Roman prisoners from the battle of Cannae by Hannibal states that the war with Rome was not to the death but for honour and power . This suggests that Hannibal hoped to break the spirit of the Romans and their willingness to fight on not their ability to do so . Whether on the battlefields or in the cornfields of Italy, Hannibal aspired to force Rome to accept his terms not to erase her from history.

The End of the Adventure

Hannibal’s Mistakes

As history shows Hannibal’s great adventure ended in failure. He used Italy as his own theatre of war and his home, but how, after losing over 120,000 men in two years , could Rome stand firm in the face of such adversity? The answer lies in the stubbornness and resilience of the Roman state, her leaders and her allies as well as the mistakes of the Punic assembly, her allies and her generals including Hannibal himself. With his place in history, it would seem strange that a portion of the blame for Carthage’s defeat would be attributed to its finest leader. Hannibal Barca was a superb tactician on the battlefield but a crucial part of his strategy was based on an unsound Carthaginian theory and therefore fundamentally flawed. His belief that the Italians and Latins would welcome him as a liberator defecting en masse as soon as he arrived turned out to be one of his biggest errors in judgement. This misconception came from the Carthaginian belief that the Roman alliance system was similar to their own empire, in that the subordinates were treated as conquered foes, constantly exploited and kept in line by over-bearing brutality. The reality was quite different as many of the allies found the series of treaties and alliances extremely profitable and enjoyed the military protection of Rome. This satisfaction with Roman suzerainty made it very difficult for Hannibal to persuade many of the Italian communities to join his cause.

Hannibal further complicated things by incorporating large numbers of Gauls into his army. Why would Roman allies abandon their own neighbours to fight alongside Gauls, who had been plundering Italian territory for centuries , or cannibalistic Numidians and Moors , in the service of a “foreign and barbarous nation” ? Hannibal did find more support as he moved further south. This is not surprising as these areas were only conquered relatively recently by Rome and some may have still remembered the Pyrrhic victories over the Romans sixty years before . Although he succeeded in making over 40% of the allies unavailable to Rome by 212BC and by 209BC, twelve of the thirty Latin colonies refused to meet their quota of men and resources, the majority of Italians and Latins, in the face of “the long, drawn out misery of constant war-service and devastated field and farms” , still remained loyal to Rome, providing enough manpower and resources for her to prevail.


Reliance on Others

With war on several fronts, Hannibal had to rely on other men to take the fight to Rome, all of who were not as capable as him. When he put faith in his two brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago, they were able to defeat and kill the extremely capable Scipios, driving the Romans from Spain almost altogether. However, their inadequacies started to show through when Rome found their saviour by appointing, illegally , the son of Publius Scipio to the Spanish command. The later Africanus proved to be a more capable leader than his father and defeated Hasdrubal and Mago in separate engagements. The brothers tried to recreate the extremely difficult Cannae strategy of their sibling Hannibal , only to be incapable of working it through the poorer quality and training of their troops. Africanus had adopted Hannibal’s tactics and the Barcas proved incapable of dealing with these new legionary techniques, failing to pool their resources to overwhelm Africanus in the early months of his command.

The Barcas have also been criticised for their efforts to support Hannibal in Italy. They and Hannibal may have thought it would have been a lot easier to bolster the Italian invasion, but the foresight of Publius Scipio to send his brother, Cnaeus, with the bulk of his consular army to Spain prevented the Carthaginians not only a free hand there but also blocked any attempted march to reinforce Hannibal. The consequences of this were crucial as Hasdrubal was thwarted in 215BC and the reinforcements under Mago intended for Italy were diverted to Spain . Another individual who let Hannibal down is Philip V of Macedon, for if he was waiting for a second invasion of Italy from Greece; he would be waiting for a long time. However, this may be overstating the importance of this alliance. Hannibal may only have been creating the fear of a second invasion and the possibility of diverting some Roman troops and resources from Italy. The ease with which Rome played the Greek states off against each other nullifying any threat from the Macedonian King suggests that the only real threat from the Graeco-Punic alliance of 215BC was the trepidation and panic it might inspire in Italy.


Carthaginian Lethargy

With war being accepted at home, Hannibal expected to receive support from the Carthaginian assembly. Again he was to be disappointed. Sources on the political system of Carthage are few and far between, despite its apparent grasp of a balanced constitution that incorporated elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy admired by several Greek philosophers, most famously Aristotle. By the third century there was strong oligarchic feel to this system as a small number of noble families dominated the council of 104 and monopolized the office of suffete. However stable this system appeared, there seems to have been a spilt between the aristocracy into the traders and farmers, who favoured foreign and African expansion respectively. These two factions often fought over the control of Carthaginian policy and if in the middle of a conflict the leadership of the council changed hands, support for the war and the generals like Hannibal and his father, Hamilcar, could falter and in severe cases disappear altogether. Again actual accounts of the Carthaginian council are scarce but we have instances that show the ebb and flow of Punic politics. Despite the apparent unanimity of the acceptance of war, there is a suggestion that a certain Hanno, the leader of the anti-Barcid faction in Carthage, condemned Hannibal’s actions and later opposed the sending of reinforcements to Italy. Hannibal was not the only party to be let down by the Carthaginian council. Punic allies were promised aid only for it to never appear. The most obvious is Philip V, who wanted to use the Roman preoccupation in Italy and Carthaginian aid to conquer Greece and Illyria. However, the Punic fleet never arrived and Philip was quickly defeated and contained.

There is very little else heard from the Carthaginian council until Africa itself was under threat from Africanus. They did send a relief fleet to Hippocrates and Epycides in Sicily but it was too late to save Syracuse and was then decimated by a plague outside the city. It is dangerous, however, to consider the lack of reported activity from Carthage as an argument of silence. We must remember that the most abundant source for the Punii was Rome itself and must therefore be treated with scepticism. It is possible that Carthage sent over 75,000 men to areas throughout the Mediterranean and this, for any other power besides Rome, was a massive undertaking. If these figures are true, it is more difficult to criticise the commitment of Carthage to the Second Punic War, however, it does call into question her strategic sense and commitment to her finest general stranded in Italy.

Roman Tenacity

Intransigence and Loyalty

The biggest obstacle for Hannibal to overcome and the overwhelming contributor to his defeat was not the mistakes of Carthage, his allies or even himself but the Roman state and her resources. In the her early years of expansion, Rome had proved herself to be unconquerable, adapting to the needs of whatever situation that arose, whether it had been the recovery after the Gallic sack in 390BC, the superior generalship of Pyrrhus or the constructing of a capable navy from scratch to challenge Carthaginian sea power in 261BC. In the war against Hannibal, she again proved this true, only on a scale that set her on the road to becoming the dominant power in Europe for the next six hundred years. I have already mentioned that Hannibal underestimated the loyalty of the Roman alliance system, but with the complex mix of Latins, Italians and Greeks hardly gave this arrangement the appearance of togetherness and it is understandable for anyone to determine that it was an uneasy arrangement. Many of the allies had little or no time for one another, but the very complexity of the network holds the key to its strength and solidarity. Allies was treated fairly and individually with an exclusive agreement linking them to Rome. These pacts were based on mutual aid and co-operation with each federate providing manpower and resources, proportionate to the size of the settlement, for the Roman military machine in return for defensive aid and a share of any war booty.

With the adversity that many of the allies faced during the war, it may have been surprising not just to Hannibal but to many Romans that so many allies remained staunch supporters. Cities like Nola and Naples had resisted coercion in the face of the entire Carthaginian army and Latin colonies like Placentia and Cremona, isolated from the main body of Italy since 218BC, still met their allocation of troops in 209BC even when twelve other colonies had refused. The relief of the Senate is shown in the glorifying of the eighteen steadfast Latin colonies with thanks being “duly tendered to them in the Senate and before the people” . The sheer extent of the network allowed Rome to absorb the loss of 40% of her allies providing her with sufficient resources to first prevent defeat, then to compete on several fronts and finally defeat Carthage.


The Roman Senate: obstinate yet flexible

Above I mentioned the gratitude of the Senate to others, but if anyone deserved recognition for their efforts it is the Senate. It encapsulated the ‘never say die’ nature of Rome, which was evident throughout her history. Rome rarely negotiated from a position of defeat and her rejection of the post-Cannae embassy of Carthalo shows that, even after the huge losses of the first three years, Rome and the Senate were as indignant and rigid as ever. It is this obstinacy that is the essential difference between Rome and Carthage. Whilst Rome never entertained the idea of peace talks, once Africanus had invaded Africa, the Carthaginians were quick to agree terms. Carthage was a mercantile and maritime power and, although by the start of the Second Punic War her naval strength had waned to a state of insignificance and despite their new Spanish empire producing high quality armies, the mind set of traders and farmers in Carthage itself could not endure an invasion of their homeland. The Romans were entirely different. Despite her advances in trade and science, she had been and always would be a military state. She had endured numerous invasions of her territory and had suffered defeats on Italian soil. These reverses and the reaction to them hardened the resolve of the Romans making them implacable foes on the battlefield, as the Roman legionnaires proved throughout the Hannibalic conflict. . It is difficult to see how the constitutionally similar Roman and Carthaginian senates could have had a more different outlook to the difficulties of an invasion.

The Roman Senate may have been rigid over peace negotiations but when it came to facing the limitations of their own oral customs, they were much more flexible. With such a dangerous opponent rampaging throughout Italy, the Romans determined to follow their leading men, entrusting them with repeated commands, breaking with tradition. The Scipios were given control in Spain for seven years, followed by Africanus for another five. The prolonging and repeated holding of offices was also practised in Italy. Fabius Cunctator’s career is the best example of how the Romans sidestepped their own constitution in times of peril. Not only were the Romans willing to disregard their rules on office holding and age restrictions, they were able to evolve their republican system as their expanding empire out grew the number of officials elected each year. Throughout the third century this was especially true of the praetorship. Before the outbreak of the First Punic War in 265BC there was just one praetor who held purely judicial responsibilities in the city of Rome itself; by the time of Carthage’s surrender in 241BC the number had doubled and had again by the Gallic conflict in the 220s . The most important change to the praetorship was its role in the Roman political system with more being given command of armies and more areas being placed under the control of a man with praetorian or propraetorian imperium . This willingness to develop their republican system made the Romans a formidable opponent, capable of incorporating and governing the vast swathes of territory that her irresistible armies would conquer over the next two centuries.


Rapid Riposte

The Roman Senate and their commanders proved adept at taking advantage of opportunities and in responding to attempts at reinforcing Hannibal. Publius Scipio recognised the threat from Spain and by sending his elder brother, Cnaeus, west prompted a realisation of the importance of cutting Hannibal’s supply line. The response to the disruptions in Greece and Sicily also helped stabilise Rome’s position, which had looked serious by 215BC. The sending of a fleet to Greece under M. Valerius Laevinus in 214BC and the alliances with the Aetolian League and Attalus I of Pergamum in 212/11BC bogged down Philip V of Macedon in local fighting, eliminating him as a threat. Sicily’s importance both geographically and as a grain supply was easily apparent and after the upheaval following Hiero II’s death, Rome was quick to send one of her foremost generals, Marcellus, to subdue the island and capture Syracuse. J.F. Lazenby argues against Field Marshal Montgomery that instead of Hannibal not understanding “fully the importance of sea power ”, that he understood it so well that he saw a march through the Alps as his only option, due to the total inadequacy of the Carthaginian navy . This importance of sea power was not lost on the Romans, who, realising their overwhelming superiority on the waves, took the opportunity to highlight this dominance with Cnaeus Scipio’s victory at the mouth of the Ebro in 217BC . However, the Romans knew that sea power was not infallible and part of the Fabian strategy was to prevent Hannibal from obtaining a large port in Italy .



General Opportunism

As well as the caution that formed the basis of the Fabian strategy, Roman opportunism, especially that of Scipio Africanus played a major role in the defeat of Carthage. Less than a year after taking control in Spain, Africanus launched an audacious attack on Cartagena, He had learned that all three Carthaginian armies were widely spread from his objective and the city itself contained a modest garrison of 1,000 men . By employing local knowledge and superstition, Africanus was able to capture a strategically important site, dealing a significant blow to Carthaginian Spain. He was given another chance with the Numidian civil war between Syphax and Masinissa. By supporting Masinissa, Africanus enlisted the aid of an extremely capable cavalry general and his army, reversing the superiority in horse that Carthage had enjoyed since the out set of the war.

The most striking example of Roman opportunism did not involve Africanus. . Having escaped Spain and invaded Italy in 207BC, Hasdrubal Barca sent a letter to his brother suggesting that they meet at Umbria. The dispatches were intercepted and the consul, C. Claudius Nero, used the details of the letter to concoct an audacious plan. Selecting 6,000 infantry and 1,000 horses , Nero marched to join his fellow consul, M. Livius Salinator, who was encamped less than a mile from Hasdrubal. To prevent the enemy from realising he now faced two consuls, Nero’s men were billeted with their “opposite number of equivalent rank”. . The extra men were to prove vital as Nero as able to encircle Hasdrubal’s army, cutting it to pieces. This deception went undetected by Hannibal until supposedly his brother’s head was thrown into his camp. He commented that with the loss of the army and of his brother, “Now, at last, I see the destiny of Carthage plain!”


Fortune Favours the Romans?

The strength of the Roman Republic and its numerous allies was not the only reason for their victory. The Romans appear to have had Bona Fortuna on their side, especially regarding the calibre of generals available to them at such a crucial point in their history. Q. Fabius Maximus, whose strategy of stop trying to defeat Hannibal and just prevent him from winning was the real turning point of the war in Italy, is singled out as a saviour of the state. If Fabius Cunctator saved the Republic by avoiding battle with Hannibal, then Claudius Marcellus was his more aggressive contemporary, the last Roman to win the honour to dedicate the spolia opima. In 214BC, Marcellus successfully campaigned in Campania, capturing the strategic town of Casilinum, however, it was his systematic re-conquest of Sicily and capture of Syracuse that was his biggest contribution to the war. As well as these two fine generals, Rome produced a family to rival the Barcas of Carthage. Of the three Scipios, Scipio Africanus is by far the most well known. By understanding Hannibal’s tactics, Punic superiority in cavalry, adapting the Roman legion to make it more manoeuvrable and equipping his soldiers with the gladius, Africanus was able to conquer Spain, invade Africa and earn his place as “the man who won the Hannibalic War” . However, this prominence of Africanus is to the detriment of the importance of the Scipio brothers, Cnaeus and Publius. The foresight to send an army to Spain preventing reinforcements coming to Hannibal was vital to Rome’s ability to contain Carthage’s greatest general.


Conclusion


With such a formidable force of manpower, resources and competent generals opposing him, it is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to break the Romans spirit. Some, including Field Marshal Montgomery, suggest that Maharbal, Hannibal’s cavalry commander, was correct by declaring that the great general did not know how to use a victory by not marching on Rome following the earth-shattering victory at Cannae. When I first started writing this piece I was also of this opinion, but after digging deeper into the situation I have changed my position and think that to declare unambiguously that “Maharbal was right” is to forget the previous five hundred years of Roman history. The Romans had rarely surrendered without a fight and Hannibal had neither the manpower nor the siege train to capture a city the size of Rome. Hannibal must have known this, as there is little or no evidence in his movements that he ever entertained the idea of attacking Rome. He is slated for his misreading of the Roman alliance system, but it is a misconception that many would have made and even if he had realised the strength of the bonds of loyalty, they were so strong that there was little else he could do to encourage desertion. It must be remembered that Hannibal still managed to obtain the defection of many Italian communities and the two biggest cities in Italy apart from the capital itself, Capua and Tarentum. He defeated his enemy in three major engagements and at Cannae inflicted perhaps the largest casualties for over two millennia. We will never know how close the Romans came to negotiating during the dark days of 216BC.

In the end, Hannibal was to become one of a special breed of commander; perhaps only Napoleon Bonaparte draws a fair comparison, remaining undefeated in pitched battle until he had passed his zenith. At Zama he did not have superiority in cavalry he had enjoyed throughout his great adventure in Italy and his army was not the disciplined force that had steamrollered Rome. Perhaps Hannibal was not the same man who had attacked Saguntum seventeen years previous. His reported comment after hearing of his brother’s defeat and death suggests that his spirit had been broken and he feared for the survival of his homeland. He had every right to feel downhearted. His irresistible force had met its match in the immovable object of the Roman Republic and her allies. Any other power in the ancient and perhaps medieval worlds would not have been able to stand firm after the catastrophic losses suffered by Rome. Hannibal could only watch as his strategies of encouraging defection and winning spectacular victories were nullified by the loyalty of the Italians and the stringent implementing of the Fabian strategy. It was only natural that after so many years eventually one of the participants would begin to run out of steam and by failing to match the resources of the Roman Republic, it was inevitable that it would be Hannibal.


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