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Spartan National Character in Thucydides

The History of the Peloponnesian War written by Thucydides stands as possibly the most famous work in the western historical tradition. Thucydides himself stated that he wrote his history to be a “possession for all time.” Thucydides’ work has stood through the centuries since its conception as a monument of the man who penned it. He has received great fame and adulation as the first critical historian. Recent years have seen an increase in criticism of Thucydides and his account of the Peloponnesian War. Nevertheless, the work still stands as one of the most important works for the modern practice of history.

The History of the Peloponnesian War has instigated the rise of numerous commentaries and other works on this ancient text. Modern authors have tried to determine exactly what Thucydides was attempting to say and whether his biases are evident in his text. One such attempt, written by Robert D. Luginbill is an effort to determine the impact of national character on the Peloponnesian War as described and illustrated by Thucydides. Luginbill’s book is divided into two main sections. The first section, which includes chapters one through six, discusses human nature and its relation to national character. It is in these chapters that Luginbill develops the idea of the motivating factors of fear and hope as the main factors that move men. The second section of the book is Luginbill’s description of national character, first of the Spartans, then of the Athenians, and later of the Syracusans. Luginbill does an excellent job of presenting the character traits of the individual states mentioned as he theorizes Thucydides depicts them.

In essence, though Luginbill uses far more diverse words to describe them, the Spartans are cautious, slow and fearful. Luginbill uses a great deal of evidence from Thucydides in order to typify them in this manner. The Spartans are cautious (atolmoi) and slow (bradeis). Thucydides uses other words to portray these characteristics including weakness (malakia, 5.7.2), inactivity (apragmosune, 1.32.5), fear (fobos, 1.74.2-4), and hesitancy (okneo, 7.21.4). For Luginbill, these traits of the Spartans as described by Thucydides should be considered Spartan national characteristics. Of great importance are two passages in particular. The first is the speech of the Corinthians to the Spartans at 1.68-71. Typical Spartan attribute is to “always do less than you could have done, to mistrust your own judgment, however sound it may be, and to assume that dangers will last for ever.” This speech by the Corinthians was an attempt to motivate the Spartans to war. The second of these two important passages is in 8.96 in which Thucydides stated that the Spartans were the most convenient of enemies for the Athenians because of the “wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the Spartans as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents.” Based on these two passages, Luginbill argues that the Spartans were motivated by fear alone and because of this acted only defensively, and he argues his point using Thucydides.

Despite the accurate reading of Thucydides, or perhaps because of it, Luginbill’s assertion that the Spartans were a people motivated by fear, and were otherwise slow or unwilling to act, the History of the Peloponnesian War only supports this theory to a degree. That the Spartans were a people that were cautious cannot be argued. Thucydides’ account is unequivocal on this account. However, like Archidamus himself believed, slow and cautious may just as easily be considered wise and sensible. By looking at the examples taken from the History and used by Luginbill to illustrate these national characteristics of the Spartans, it is possible to see the Spartans were often mistreated by Thucydides, and this has led to Luginbill’s assertion that the Spartans were only motivated by fear.

In the third year of the war, Phormio defeated the Spartan fleet in the Crisaean Gulf. The Athenians had twenty ships while the Spartans had manned forty-seven triremes. The Spartans had not believed that the Athenians would attack the much larger force. The superior skill of the Athenian sailors proved decisive and the Spartans were defeated. Despite this, the Spartans were eager to engage the Athenians again. Three commissioners were sent out to re-equip the ships and to gather more ships. Luginbill states that the Spartans were reluctant to face the Athenians again because they were fearful following their first encounter with the Athenians. What Luginbill does not state is that it was not the Spartan leaders who were fearful of another engagement, but rather their men. The Spartan leaders, including Cnemus and Brasidas were eager for an engagement with the Athenians according to Thucydides. Luginbill argues that the Spartan leaders only sought a battle because they feared that the Athenians would get reinforcements. Unfortunately, Thucydides does not support Luginbill’s statement. Thucydides here says the Cnemus, Brasidas and the other Spartan generals “wanted to bring on a battle quickly, before reinforcements arrived from Athens.” (boulomenoi en taxnei twn naumaxnian poi sai prin ti kai apo twn Athwnaiwn epibowthwsai). The idea of fear is not even presented in these lines, yet Luginbill attributes fear to the Spartan commanders. He has to show that the Spartans were afraid of Athenian reinforcements and that fear is what drove them to seek a battle. In fact, Cnemus, Brasidas and the other Spartan generals were merely following sound tactical thought when they wished to engage the enemy before reinforcements arrived.

While Luginbill occasionally misinterprets Thucydides’ comments regarding the national character of the Spartans, there is no doubt that Thucydides believed that the Spartans were slow and cautious by nature. Again, a reading of book eight, chapter ninety-six will verify this belief. Given this viewpoint, it is unsurprising that the Spartans are treated unfairly from time to time within the History by Thucydides himself. One such example is that of the aborted attack on the Piraeus led by the aforementioned Cnemus and Brasidas. The account of this action comes from book two, not long after the events in the Crisaean Gulf already discussed above. The Megarians persuaded the Peloponnesian commanders to make an attempt on the Piraeus. The Megarians argued that due to the Athenians decided superiority at sea, the port had been left unguarded and open. Convinced, Cnemus, Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian commanders agreed to make the attack. They led their men overland from Corinth to Megara. At Nisaea, forty vessels awaited the Peloponnesians. The Spartan led force immediately set sail, but inexplicably decided, out of fear, to attack Salamis, not the Piraeus. Thucydides stated that they “greatly feared the risk” (katadeisantes ton kindunon), but gives no reason for this change of mind. At one point, the Peloponnesians had been happy to attack the Piraeus. Nevertheless, having marched overland, they decided upon launching their ships, to forego their original plan. The Spartans truly look foolish and cowardly in this account.

However, while Thucydides gave us this account, I think he also provided us with the reason the Spartans changed their minds and attacked the lightly defended Salamis instead. Thucydides stated in 2.93.3 that there was no fleet on guard at the Piraeus. However, at 2.94.2 he informed us that at dawn, having been warned by the signal fires from Salamis, the Athenians launched their ships from the Piraeus and sailed to Salamis. It would appear that the Athenians did indeed have a fleet at the Piraeus. It is possible that the Peloponnesians had believed the Megarian claim that no fleet was in the Piraeus. Upon arriving in the waters outside of Nisaea, the Spartans learned that there was indeed a fleet at the Piraeus. Doing the only thing they could, they attacked Salamis, captured the ships there and plundered the island before heading back to Nisaea. Indeed, Diodorus Siculus stated that the Athenians manned a considerable number of warships. While it may have still be possible for the Spartans to attack the Piraeus, it was unlikely to succeed given the fact that the Spartans had been misled by the Megarians concerning the Piraeus’ defenses. An attack on the Piraeus at this time would have been unlikely to succeed given the circumstances, and with Athens’ clear superiority at sea, any success the Peloponnesians might have had would have been short lived. This was not an act of cowardice on the part of the Spartans, but an acknowledgement of the circumstances. Thucydides’ attribution of fear here is unfair considering the fact that the Athenians quite likely did have a fleet stationed to protect the Piraeus.

The Mytilenian revolt from the Delian League in 428 provides yet another example which Luginbill uses to try to demonstrate that the Spartans were fearful and slow. The introduction of the Spartan general Alcidas here is of importance, for in Luginbill’s mind, Alcidas is the personification of the negative traits of the Spartans, namely slowness and lack of daring. This characterization of Alcidas is not entirely accurate.

When most of the island of Lesbos decided to revolt from Athens, the Mytilenians sent an embassy to Sparta asking the Peloponnesians for aid in their upcoming struggle against the Athenians. The Spartans agreed, and exhibited notable zealousness for the task. In fact, the Spartans were quite excited about the prospect of aiding Mytilene in their revolt from Athens. This eagerness was not shared by Sparta’s allies. Thucydides makes it quite clear that the Spartans were enthusiastic about the venture. This very fervor for aiding the Mytilenians in their revolt belies Luginbill’s assertion that the Spartans only acted out of fear. Indeed, this was an act of boldness and hope, the characteristics that Thucydides gives to the Athenians, not the Spartans. The introduction of Alcidas, and the account of his command leave little doubt that Thucydides was intent on showing the Spartan commander in an unfavorable light.

In order to aid Mytilene, the Spartans planned to send a fleet of ships and at the same time invade Attica in order to keep Athens’ attention on the mainland. The man chosen to lead the Peloponnesian fleet was Alcidas. Given a command of 42 ships from the allies, Alcidas was to sail across the Aegean in order to give aid to the Mytilenians. Twice in the account about this rebellion Thucydides takes issue with the speed with which Alcidas went about fulfilling his command. At 3.27 Thucydides says that the ships from the Peloponnese “so far from putting in an appearance, continued to waste time on the way.” (ouxh hwkon apo twn Peloponnwsou alla enexhrovizon). Again, just a few lines later in 3.29, Thucydides states that the Peloponnesian fleet wasted time. oi d en tais tessarakonta nausi Peloponnwsioi, hous edei en taxhei paragenesthai, pleontes peri te autw twn Peloponnwson endietripsan kai kata ton allon ploun sxholaioi komisthentes tous men ek tws polews Athwnaious lanthznousi, prin dw twI Dwlwi esxhon, prosmeicantes d ap autws tw Ikarw kai MukonwI punthanontai prwton hoti hw Mutilwnw healwken. Thucydides, and thus Luginbill see the slowness of Alcidas as just one more illustration of the slowness of the Spartan war effort. They are not alone. Donald Kagan accepts the Thucydidean statements without criticism. Kagan argues that “The delay of Alcidas was fatal to the rebels of Mytilene.”

The above passage is nearly all the information Thucydides gave us about the voyage from the Peloponnese to Mytilene. We know that they left the Peloponnese before the invasion of Attica took place and we know that they arrived at Embaton in Erythrai seven days after Mytilene surrendered to the Athenians. We also are told of several stops they made along the way to Mytilene. It certainly appears that Alcidas was negligent in his duties. However, the lack of information concerning this voyage leaves doubt about the manner in which it was carried out. The Spartans had been excited in their efforts to aid the revolt and it seems unlikely that the man chosen to head the mission would have acted so slowly deliberately.

So why did Alcidas arrive so late? One of the first things that must be noted is that the fleet that was given to Alcidas was composed of ships from a number of allies of Sparta. Thucydides already stated in 3.15 that the Spartan allies were not at all excited about the expedition to Lesbos to aid the Mytilenians. kai hoi men prothumws tauta eprasson, hoi de alloi cummaxhoi Bradews te cunelegonto kai en karpou cunkomidw wsan kai arrwstiai tou strateuein. With the rest of the allies not interested in going on the expedition, Alcidas was going to have trouble getting the 42 ships he had been appointed. Thucydides stated that Alcidas’ fleet wasted time in their voyage around the Peloponnese and Luginbill argues that this illustrates an aspect of the Spartan national character, slowness and dilatoriness. However, more likely, due to the unwillingness of the allies, the time spent sailing around the Peloponnese was probably used by Alcidas to obtain the ships he had been given. Without these ships, it would not have mattered how quickly Alcidas sailed, for he would have had no force with which to aid Mytilene.

There is, perhaps, even less reason to believe that Alcidas proceeded leisurely from the Peloponnese to Erythrai. Joseph Rosiman argues that given the lack of any timetable by Thucydides, one can merely use conjecture in trying to determine the speed of Alcidas’ voyage. Starting at Cyllene the fleet sailed around the Peloponnese. The distance from Cyllene to Erythrai was 736 kilometers. Using two sets of speed estimates, one from W. W. Tarn and the other from L. Casson, Roisman attempts to determine how quickly the fleet could have arrived at Erythrai, and thus Mytilene. Using the estimate of L. Casson, Roisman argues that there was no way for Alcidas to have arrived in Mytilene before the surrender of the city. Nor could he have done so using the somewhat faster speed of travel offered by Tarn. Alcidas would have still been sailing to Mytilene when the city surrendered. Using the fastest rate of speed suggested by Tarn, it is possible that the Spartan fleet had not even left the Peloponnese when the Mytilenians submitted to the Athenians. Given favorable sailing conditions, it is possible that Alcidas could have made it to Mytilene before the city fell, but only barely. Still, Thucydides’ statement that Alcidas proceeded at a leisurely pace seems unfounded. So, while Alcidas may have sailed slowly around the Peloponnese as he collected ships, it seems unlikely that he sailed slowly from the Peloponnese to Mytilene. It would appear that Mytilene surrendered too soon.

Alcidas remains the subject of Thucydides’ detestation. When Alcidas learns and verifies that Mytilene has indeed fallen to the Athenians, he is advised by the Elean commander Teutiaplus that a surprise assault on the Athenian fleet and a night attack against Mytilene will see Sparta recapture Mytilene. Alcidas rejects this plan as he does the plan of the Ionian exiles and Lesbians who were with him to capture and use as a base one of the other Ionian cities. In both cases, Thucydides took the opportunity to characterize Alcidas as fainthearted. Alcidas it seems, was in a great hurry to return to the Peloponnese. O de oude tauta enedexheto, alla to pleiston tws gnwmws eixhen, epeidw tws Mutilwnws husterwkei, oti taxhista twI Peloponnwswi palin prosmeicai. Again, Thucydides provides us with evidence contrary to his opinion concerning Alcidas. Alcidas, rather than immediately leave for home, sailed first to Myonnesus and attacked that city. From there he moved to Ephesus where he received envoys from the Samians. Only after this did Alcidas begin his journey back to the Peloponnese.

Alcidas has been criticized for not following the advice of Teutiaplus and the Ionian exiles. Such advice however, while it may have been successful in the short run, may well have injured Sparta and her war effort more than it hurt the Athenians. Had he followed the Eleans advice, Alcidas would have been attacking a larger naval force than he commanded (considering the superiority of the Athenians at sea, this would not have been an option) and would have engaged in a nighttime attack on Mytilene. Nighttime attacks are always hazardous, for the attacker as much as for who is being attacked. Moreover, the supposition that the Athenians were scattered and unorganized was by no means true. To follow the advice of Teutiaplus would have been daring, but unwise.

Had Sparta done as the Ionians wished and captured an Ionian town, the Athenians would have besieged him. This would have led to the loss of the 42 ships which Alcidas commanded. In Kagan’s mind, the loss of the 42 ships with Alcidas would have been a good price to pay for the cost Athens would pay for a siege and in lost revenue. Kagan also argues that the loss of the 42 triremes would have been a small one to Sparta as they had to give up their naval activity completely in 425. While may indeed be true, one cannot judge Alcidas on what was to happen. The loss of this squadron of ships would have hurt the Spartans, and Alcidas undoubtedly understood this. The loss of warships may have outweighed whatever damage his actions would have done to the Athenians. While Thucydides portrayed Alcidas in an unfavorable light, the evidence would not seem to support such a characterization. True, the Spartan had chosen caution over foolhardiness, but this is hardly a reason to castigate him. Thus, Luginbill’s theory that Alcidas represents every negative character trait of the Spartans is not feasible.

If Thucydides’ account of the Alcidas’ actions is not accurate and his characterization of those actions is unfounded, one must ask why Thucydides chose to portray Alcidas in this manner. It is possible that Thucydides believed his decisions in Ionia were the wrong ones. If this was the case, Thucydides would have believed Alcidas to be an incapable general and it would come as no surprise that Alcidas is portrayed as slow, overly cautious and fainthearted. This is an entirely plausible supposition, for Thucydides believed the Periclean strategy would have won the war. While Thucydides may have been a competent general, he inaccurately believes that Pericles’ strategy would have won the war for Athens. He thus has shown that he can make errors in judgment regarding military matters.

The other possible option is that Thucydides needed to make Alcidas look bad for another reason. One wonders what that might be. While Thucydides may have had nothing in particular against Alcidas himself, he admired Brasidas, one of Alcidas’ advisors at Corcyra. Against the advice of Brasidas, Thucydides tells us, Alcidas did not attack the city of Corcyra. Thucydides admired Brasidas, as already noted. Thucydides said that Brasidas had a great reputation for energy and that he was upright and moderate in all his dealings. Because Thucydides admired Brasidas and Brasidas had shown himself to be energetic, Thucydides would naturally believe Brasidas had advocated attacking Corcyra. It was clearly Alcidas, in Thucydides’ mind, that had rejected the plan. Having shown himself to be fearful, Thucydides would have believed that Alcidas was fearful in all his military ventures. Thucydides’ view of Alcidas was most likely colored by his bias in favor of Brasidas, and thus against Alcidas. The Spartans themselves did not, evidently, consider Alcidas a failure. In 426, Alcidas along with Leon and Damagon were the leaders of the new colony founded at Heraclea in Trachis. The colony was a military foundation and it seems unlikely that the Spartans would have chosen someone who had failed them so dismally militarily to lead their new martial settlement.

The Spartans were indeed a cautious people. They always thought through their actions before hand in order to be prepared for whatever might be the result. When they determined that the possible gains were not worth the possible loss, they chose to not act. While it is apparent that in some instances Thucydides criticizes the Spartans for their lack of initiative, it is also apparent that for the most part he agrees with their cautious nature. Concerning the battle of Mantinea, Gomme agreed. “They had won this victory not by the enterprising genius of Brasidas . . . but by their traditional slowness,”

It is in the wake of the Corcyraean civil war that the ideas of slowness and caution took on meanings of cowardice and indecisiveness. The defining passages comes in book three when Thucydides stated:

“To fit in with the change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was
now regarded as the courage one would expect to find in a party member; to
think of future and wait was merely another way of saying one was coward;
any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character;
ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted
for action. Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot against
an enemy behind his back was perfectly legitimate self-defense.”

It was this change of word usage that leads to the charge of cowardice and dilatoriness in both Thucydides’ day and in our own. Luginbill has accepted that caution and slowness represent cowardice and indecision. Indeed, following the Spartan victory at Mantinea, the record of cowardice and negligence heaped upon the Spartans previously by their allies was wiped out. All of Sparta’s previous misfortunes were credited to chance. It is thus obvious that the Spartans were never cowards, but rather continued to hold their traditional virtues of caution and slowness as important.

Luginbill argues that the Spartan national psyche was one of caution, slowness and lack of daring. As already noted above, the Spartans undoubtedly fit this description to a large extent, yet they were able to overcome these traits when the time merited it. Their enthusiastic support of the Mytilenian rebellion is one example. Individuals in Thucydides also defy the stereotype that Luginbill attempts to impose on the Spartans. While Thucydides, for the most part, portrays the Spartans as slow and cautious, one man stands out as entirely different; Brasidas.

Even before Brasidas had his own command, Thucydides shows him as a daring and energetic man. At Corcyra, it is Brasidas who encourages Alcidas to attack the Corcyraean’s city. Brasidas was also involved with the aborted attempt against the Piraeus mentioned earlier. The planned attack was a bold one, worthy of Brasidas. As argued above, their failure to attack had little to do with cowardice and more to do with the fact that the Athenians did indeed have a fleet at Piraeus. Brasidas also did not hesitate to try to reclaim Megara from the Athenians. He immediately marched to Megara and asked to be admitted to the city. Upon being refused, he gathered his troops and offered the Athenians battle. Neither side began the battle, and eventually the Athenians retreated back to Nisaea. Brasidas’ quick action had saved Megara. His campaigns in Thrace did nothing to tarnish his reputation as an energetic and daring commander. In Thucydides’ narrative, Brasidas stands out as the one true exception to the rule of overly cautious and slow commanders.

Yet Brasidas is not the only Spartan commander to show these qualities. The young navarch Callicratidas also showed great daring and enterprise, coupled with no slowness and very little caution. Upon assuming command of the Spartan forces, Callicratidas immediately moved against the Athenians at Delphinium. After taking Delphinium, Callicratidas immediately moved against Teos which he took by storm. Both places lay north of Samos where the Athenian fleet lay. Callicratidas moved against Methymna then on Lesbos and took the city. He nearly captured the Athenian fleet in a trap near the Hundred Isles. Even so, Callicratidas chased Conon to Mytilene where he was able to trap forty Athenian ships and capture or destroy an additional thirty. The young commander had come very close to destroying the entire Athenian fleet. The battle of Arginusae put an end to Callicratidas, but his career vividly portrays him as a man of boldness and daring. He displays nothing of the fearfulness and slowness with which Thucydides characterized many of his countrymen.

Callicratidas along with Brasidas are examples of Spartans who do not fit the description of Spartans given by Thucydides, either in his own voice or in the voice of the Corinthians and other allies. As has already been stated, there is no reason to argue that the Spartans were not cautious. They were. The cautious aspect of Spartan behavior is not a negative one in Thucydides, despite the fact that the allies of Sparta often equate it as such. Thucydides seems to have held the opinion that caution and patience would win the day. Indeed, he supported Pericles’ policy of caution. He lived to see the end of the war, so he knew that it was the Spartan’s caution and patience that won the war, not the Athenian characteristic of daring and overextension. Thucydides did, however, use the terms of his day to describe the Spartans, and those terms, as noted, had connotations of cowardice and weakness in them.

Luginbill, along with many others have chosen to accept the post-Corcyraean definition of the meanings of these words. They accept that the cautiousness of the Spartans equates to fear and lethargy. The ancient Greeks accepted these definitions as well, and thus the allegations in Thucydides that the Spartans had grown cowardly and slow. Given Thucydides’ description of the change in the meaning of words, this is not unexpected. But Thucydides may have intended these words to have their original meaning, while acknowledging that for many, such definitions no longer remained accurate. Thucydides did not approve of the changes to the definitions, and so may have refused to use them with their new connotations. His explanation in 3.82 may be intended to inform his audience of what these terms should mean.

Luginbill’s book illustrates the fact that Thucydides believed that the Spartans missed opportunities due to their cautiousness. Thucydides did censure the Spartans for this on occasion for their lapses. But Luginbill argues that the Spartans were incapable of acting in any other way, and this belief is not supported by the facts, either as they are presented to us in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War or in the accounts of Diodorus and Xenophon. Thucydides’ own characterizations can occasionally be shown to be, if not false, then misleading.

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