End of the Seleucid Empire : Rome’s “Imperium” in Syria
The end of the Seleucid Empire is often dated to the year 64 B.C.E. in which the great Roman soldier Pompey decided
to attach the tattered remains of the Seleucid Empire to Rome’s
growing list of provinciae. Another Roman General, Lucullus, had
recently restored the Seleucid monarchy after chasing Mithridates VI
Eupator out of Pontus and Tigranes II of Armenia out of Syria. Why the
change in policy towards this dying Near Eastern kingdom ? This article
looks at the way Rome understood “imperium” as not only compatible
with, but also a guarantee of “freedom.”
| In many books dealing with the history of the ancient Near East, the end of the Seleucid Empire is dated to the year 64 B.C.E., the year in which the great Roman military strategist Gnaeus Pompey decided that he would tolerate neither Antiochus XIII nor Philip II “Philoromaeus”, the two Seleucid cousins quarelling over the already meaningless title of King of Syria, nor any other local prince who was entertaining ideas of taking over that territory. With one broad sweep, Pompey attached the tattered remains of the Seleucid Empire to Rome’s growing list of provinciae. Syria thus disappeared as an independent kingdom. It did however continue to exist as a Graeco-Roman entity : no longer autonomous, but falling within the imperium of a Roman proconsul, a status that would endure for another 700 years. |
Pompey. © Copyright R. Piperno. Used with permission.
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Now while the foregoing version of Seleucid history is true, it is also misleading. For one might get the impression that Pompey and the Roman Senate behind him were out to conquer foreign lands, as Alexander and others had done before them. It is true that turning the kingdom into a Roman province put Rome in direct control. Nevertheless, I would argue together with other historians that in the first place, neither Pompey nor the Roman Senate was the cause of that kingdom’s demise. Far from acting as a destroyer, Pompey was acting as a restorer : a restorer albeit not of an independent kingdom but of political order and stability in the Near East. The price that the Syrian Greeks had to pay was their independence. Yet it was still not Pompey who deprived them of that. They had already lost it or traded it away for a semblance of peace twenty years earlier. For the Seleucid kingdom ceased to exist in 83 B.C.E. when Tigranes II, King of Armenia, was accepted by the Syrian Greeks as their legitimate monarch. Secondly, in abolishing the monarchy, Pompey’s intention was not to reverse Rome’s Near Eastern policy. In undoing the restoration of the Seleucid dynasty accomplished by Lucullus, Pompey was following the same line of foreign policy : the guarantee of libertas in the Hellenistic world, but libertas as Rome understood it, not as the Greeks did.
Flashback : Syria Becomes Armenian
83 B.C.E. Politics in the Near East resembles nothing so much as a game of chess between insane opponents. Two Syrian Greeks, Philip I and his cousin Antiochus X, are scrounging around for powerful friends to support them in their respective claims to the Seleucid throne. Predictably, neither is succeeding. The realm, though still standing, shrinks daily. Predators abound. To the east, Orodes I the King of Parthia is trying to recover lost territory bordering on Seleucid land but is held in check by Tigranes II as well as by palace revolutions at home. In the south, the Ptolemaic dynasty fares no better than the Seleucid one, addicted as it is to bloodbaths and family intrigues. Between Parthia and Egypt, the Nabataeans and other desert chieftains are eating away at Syria’s domains. To the northwest, Mithridates VI Eupator, King of Pontus, quietly readies for a second war against Rome, while Cilicia thrives on the lucrative business of banditry and piracy, and its domain is said to extend over the whole Mediterranean right up to the Pillars of Hercules.
 Tigranes’ empire : click for complete map
The strongest powers in this playing field are Mithridates VI and Tigranes II, in that order. They are allies ; Tigranes’ wife Cleopatra is a daughter of Mithridates. Tigranes can therefore feel relatively secure on his throne. [1] As the monarchs of the time were wont, he felt the urge to expand. He moved into the Seleucid kingdom -- Syria and parts of Cilicia -- where he met with little if any resistance. [2] One of his lieutenants, Magadates, took up residence in Antioch where he acted as viceroy, handling matters in the king’s name. |
| The fourteen years of Tigranes’ rule over Syria prove to have restored some degree of peace to allow pursuits like trading with the Far East, although the times were not always peaceful. Ancient sources for the history of the region in this time period tend to concentrate on military events and tell us little about ordinary civilian life. [3] Certainly the second and third Mithridatic Wars changed the destiny of the Mediterranean world. Armenian Syria’s fate had become linked with that of Armenia and so, by the rules of dynastic alliance, with that of the Pontus and was determined by Mithridates’ final confrontation with Rome.
A False Return of the Monarchy |
Tigranes II of Armenia
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| Because Tigranes failed to deliver Mithridates, a fugitive in Armenia, to the Romans, the Roman general and proconsul of Asia, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, invaded Armenia in 69 B.C.E., conquered the capital city Tigranocerta and put its king to flight. The ensuing peace settlement stipulated that Tigranes abandon the Seleucid territories which again became an independent kingdom. That decision did not displease the Syrian Greeks who had by this time turned against their Armenian ruler. Tigranes gone, Antiochus XIII, a son of Antiochus X, claimed the title of King of Syria. [4] The Roman Senate accepted this state of affairs for as long as the war against Mithridates wasn’t over. But only five years later, in 64 B.C.E. Pompey routed the Pontic king for good and turned Syria into a Roman province. Why these changes ? Why the recognition of a Seleucid kingdom in 69, and why was that political option so quickly abandoned ? For what reason did the Roman Senate change its attitude towards the Seleucid kingdom in 64 ? What new political strategy, if any, was Rome thinking to implement ?
It seems to me that since Lucullus’ and Pompey’s presence in the Near East stemmed primarily from the war against Mithridates, the political stance taken with regard to Syria also stemmed from that conflict. The slogan that Rome had used before and was using still to justify the wars fought on Greek soil was the defense of Greek freedom. However, what the Romans meant by libertas was slightly different from what the Greeks meant by the Greek word eleutheria. For many Greek cities in the first century, eleutheria in the original sense of independence and of not being subject to another city or people, belonged to the past. In the new world order, the question was not whether a city-state would regain independence but whether it could be free to govern itself by its own laws while at the same time acknowledging the hegemonía of another city-state, in this instance Rome. That outlook happened to fit the Roman definition of libertas in which the rule of law prevailed over the more or less arbitrary rule of a monarch or tyrant. Since the Hellenistic world was entirely in the hands of monarchs, the Romans at that time, governed by a Senate under a Republic, came to consider themselves as the only free people in the civilised world. As a corollary, any other people who accepted Rome’s imperium as opposed to obedience to a Hellenistic monarch / tyrant enjoyed libertas by extension. [5] The Greeks well understood that complete autonomy was no longer an option, which is why many cities hesitated to side with Rome against Mithridates in 74. It was a case of Greeks banding together in the name of a common Greek heritage of freedom. But when it came down to a choice between survival and destruction, the Greeks chose survival under Roman control. Such last-ditch changes of allegiance had occurred before ; the city of Ephesus, for example, when it belatedly declared itself against Mithridates in the First Mithridatic War, stated that it would fight with Rome “for the sake of the supremacy (hegemonía) of the Romans and the freedom of all,” meaning the liberty of the Greek cities in Asia. [6]
So when Lucullus began to settle Syria’s affairs after defeating Tigranes in 69, I believe that his concern was not at all with the right of the Seleucid Empire to exist as an independent state, or with the legitimacy of one prince over another but only with Rome’s imperium in that area. He might have chosen Antiochus XIII as king because the rival Philip II’s father had been an accomplice of Rome’s enemy. Whatever his reasons for putting Antiochus XIII on the throne, by imposing Rome’s method of settlement, Lucullus was fulfilling his mission to restore peace and stability to the Near East. To accomplish that mission, there was yet no need to create a new province. [7] The notions of imperium and libertas seemed compatible with having a client (or puppet) king in Syria ; by no stretch of the imagination did Antiochus XIII appear to have been capable of assuming the role of monarch, much less tyrant. [8]
Consequently, when Pompey was sent to replace Lucullus and abolished the monarchy, I believe that that decision did not signify a change in Roman policy. That policy remained intact : the establishment of Rome’s imperium in the Near East. In the eyes of the Roman Senate, the issue had never been the survival of the Seleucid Empire. What had changed since 69 was that the king’s incompetence had proved to invite chaos which obstructed Rome’s command. By deposing the king and installing a Roman magistrate -- Aulus Gabinius was the first proconsul of Syria -- Pompey was implementing the same policy as his predecessor when he had restored the Seleucid dynasty.
Rome’s hegemonía in the former Seleucid Empire turned out to be a blessing. If all freedom had been lost, so had anarchy. Stability and prosperity followed immediately on the heels of the Roman take-over. Even before Syria was made into a province, Romans adopted the role of benevolent evergetes. In the year 67, while Philip II momentarily occupied the throne, the proconsul of Roman Cilicia, Q. Marcius Rex, made arrangements to build a palace and a circus at Antioch. In exchange, the king was to make a contribution to the cost of Rome’s operations being carried out against the pirates in the area. Later, in 64, Pompey solemnly granted libertas to Antioch, Seleucia Pieria and other cities in Syria. In addition, he paid for the restoration of Antioch’s bouleuterion and increased the land around the sacred grove and temple of Apollo in Daphne. [9] These gifts, though not excessively generous, show how much times were changing ; where important building projects were undertaken, people felt secure that conflict no longer threatened to pull down in a day what would take months or years to put up.
The paradox is that as Rome’s hegemonía expanded and as Rome itself grew wealthier and more powerful, it began to lose its own sense of libertas. Lucius Cornelius Sulla had reigned for a long time as dictator in Rome, during which time free Romans felt the cruel yoke of servitium, that very curse for which its imperium was said to be the remedy. As the Hellenistic monarchies crumbled one after the other before Rome’s best generals, the Roman Senate and Republican government slowly disintegrated. Only twenty years after the deposition of the last king of Syria, Julius Caesar would be assassinated for entertaining the dream of being king of Rome, a dream that would yet come true for his heir Octavian.
Mauricius Fabius
Assassination of Caesar. Observe the statue of Pompey on the left.
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Notes
1. Having been a hostage of the Parthians in his youth, he was able to purchase his freedom and his right to rule with 70 Armenian valleys which he later won back with a show of superior military force. Strabo, Geography XI.15.
2. There is a slight possibility that the Syrian Greeks, and the Antiochenes in particular, even welcomed him with open arms -- Justinius. However, Strabo, Flavius Josephus and Appian say that he conquered the Seleucid kingdom. Given the absence of efficient rule there, the inhabitants may have surrendered quickly to avoid massacre. Philip I was permitted to hang on as a sort of governor of Cilicia, which seems to indicate that he posed no serious threat to Tigranes’ claim. Cf. Glanville Downey, Ancient Antioch, Princeton, 1963, pp. 67 - 69. The new monarch promptly deported Syrian Greeks to Armenia in order to populate Tigranocerta, the new capital city he was building ; ancient sources speak of the resentment this decision caused, and of their return to Syria when Lucullus defeated Tigranes in 69. Cf. Plutarch, Lucullus, 29.
3. Seleucid money had become appallingly scarce -- Downey, op. cit., p. 68. But when Lucullus and his men plundered Tigranocerta in 69, they got away with eight thousand talents in money, plus eight hundred drachmas from the general spoils for each man : Plutarch, op. cit. One may be justified in deducing from such spoils of war that under Armenian rule, Syria was once more generating monetary wealth and had contributed to the regal splendour of Tigranocerta. The fact that Tigranes’ realm spanned the vast territories from the Euphrates to the Pontus Euxinus and the Mediterranean Sea made it the most viable kingdom of the East. Cf. H.A. Manandian, The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to Ancient World Trade, Lisbon, 1965, pp. 53 - 55. Looking at a map, one cannot help but be reminded of the early Seleucid Empire as Seleukos I Nikator had secured it before crossing the Taurus Mountains into Asia Minor.
4. That of course meant nothing to Philip I’s son Philip II, who claimed that he was the legitimate heir to the throne. How did Antiochus XIII come to reign and reside in Syria, and where had he been previously ? The precise sequence of events is unclear. According to Justinus, Lucullus proclaimed Antiochus XIII king of Syria, with the consent of the Antiochenes. Cf. Downey, op. cit., p. 69. The widely accepted version is that Antiochus XIII could not have been king without the collaboration of Lucullus.
5. The supposed compatibility of libertas with Roman imperium was debated by the Ancients for centuries. In the 20th century, the British politician Spencer Churchill would take up the same slogan of libertas et imperium, paraphrasing Tacitus in chapter 3 of his Agricola as a policy well-suited to the British Empire. For a study of Rome’s freedom propaganda in the context of the subjugation of the Greek world, cf. Jean-Louis Ferrary, Philhellénisme et impérialisme. Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, BEFAR, Rome, 1988.
6. Ferrary, op. cit., p. 216. See also the on-line article “The First Mithridatic War and the Imperium Populi Romani” at eScholarship Editions.
7. “Where military considerations did not impose a policy of annexation, Pompey adhered to the Roman principle of leaving the administration of the eastern lands to the dependent kings or city states.” Cambridge Ancient History, vol. VIII, 1932, p. 393. Also : “The Roman conception of the empire, as early as we know anything about it, was a realistic one: they usually thought of it not as being the area covered by the formally annexed provinces, but rather as consisting of all the places over which Rome exercised power.” W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, Oxford, 1979, p. 104.
8. He fought and lost a battle with an Arab chieftain, then intrigued with another Arab, Sampsigeramus, to dispose of Philip II ; the latter intrigued in turn with a certain Aziz, and the two Arabs intrigued to dispose of the two Seleucids. Antiochus was betrayed and held prisoner by Sampsigeramus. Somehow, the Arab plot failed and both Seleucids escaped with their lives. Antiochus XIII had regained power in Antioch when Pompey arrived in 64 and deposed him. Downey, pp. 69 - 70.
9. Idem, pp. 70 - 73.
Sources
Cambridge Ancient History, vol. VIII, Cambridge, 1932
Glanville Downey, Ancient Antioch, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963
Jean-Louis Ferrary, Philhellénisme et impérialisme. Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, BEFAR, Rome, 1988
H.A. Manandian, The Trade and Cities of Armenia in Relation to Ancient World Trade, Lisbon, 1965
Plutarch, Lucullus
“The Seleucid Kings” webpage at Livius.org
For Further Reading
Robert Kallet-Marx, Hegemony to Empire: the Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995 (can be read on-line)
M. N. S. Sellers, “Republican Liberty,” on-line article derived from The Sacred Fire of Liberty: Republicanism, Liberalism and the Law, Macmillan and N.Y.U. Press, 1998
Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002
Images
The statue of Pompey (copyright) from the Rome Artlover by R. Piperno -- used with permission ; statue of Tigranes II from Armeniapedia ; a Roman centurion from Theatrum Belli ; The Death of Julius Caesar, painting by Vincenzo Camuccini (1798), from Mon Légionnaire weblog ; map of Tigranes II’s empire from Armeniapedia.
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Divinely Decadent Demi Domus
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